Abstract
The previous schemes for rational delegation of computation resorting to game theory focus on what is the possible equilibrium results. However, they seem to ignore how to design an optimal incentive mechanism scientifically and effectively so that the final result meets designer’s expectations when a information structure is given. More importantly, there is an open question that whether the designed rational delegation of computation protocol is still secure in the UC framework. To address these challenges, in this paper, we first construct a reputation model leveraging Gompertz model to ensure that client can choose high-quality computing parties. Secondly, we design an optimal mechanism resorting to contract theory in the case of information asymmetry. Then we construct an ideal functionality for rational delegation of computation based on reputation and contract theory. In addition, we design a protocol for rational delegation of computation based on reputation and contract theory to securely realize the functionality. In the end, we prove that the proposed protocol is still secure in the UC framework.
Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 61662009 and 61772008; Science and Technology Major Support Program of Guizhou Province under Grant No. 20183001; Ministry of Education-China Mobile Research Fund Project under Grant No. MCM20170401; Key Program of the National Natural Science Union Foundation of China under Grant No. U1836205; Science and Technology Program of Guizhou Province under Grant No. [2019]1098; Project of High-level Innovative Talents of Guizhou Province under Grant No. [2020]6008; Innovative talent team of Guizhou ordinary colleges and Universitie(Guizhou-Education-Talent-Team[2013]09).
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We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and helpful suggestions.
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Jiang, X., Tian, Y. (2020). Rational Delegation of Computation Based on Reputation and Contract Theory in the UC Framework. In: Yu, S., Mueller, P., Qian, J. (eds) Security and Privacy in Digital Economy. SPDE 2020. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1268. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9129-7_23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9129-7_23
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