Abstract
The issue of iterated theory change is indeed interesting. Legal codes are under constant modification, new discoveries shape scientific theories, and robots ought to update their representation of the world each time a sensor gains new data. A pertinent criticism to the AGM formalism of theory change [Alchourrón et al.,1985] is its lack of definition with respect to iterated change. Let’s start by introducing the basic elements in the AGM framework
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Areces, C., Becher, V. (2001). Iterable AGM Functions. In: Williams, MA., Rott, H. (eds) Frontiers in Belief Revision. Applied Logic Series, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9817-0_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9817-0_13
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