Abstract
This proposal aims to combine the best properties of paper-based and end-to-end verifiable remote voting systems. Ballots are delivered electronically to voters, who return their votes on paper together with some cryptographic information that allows them to verify later that their votes were correctly included and counted.
We emphasise the ease of the voter’s experience, which is not much harder than basic electronic delivery and postal returns. A typical voter needs only to perform a simple check that the human-readable printout reflects the intended vote. The only extra work is adding some cryptographic information into the same envelope as the human-readable vote.
The proposed scheme is not strictly end-to-end verifiable, because it depends on procedural assumptions at the point where the ballots are received. These procedures should be public and could be enforced by a group of observers, but are not publicly verifiable afterwards by observers who were absent at the time.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Adida, B.: Helios: Web-based Open-Audit Voting (2008)
Benaloh, J., Byrne, M., Kortum, P., McBurnett, N., Pereira, O., Stark, P.B., Wallach, D.S.: Star-vote: A secure, transparent, auditable, and reliable voting system (2012)
Benaloh, J.: Simple verifiable elections. In: Proc. 1st USENIX Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2006)
Benaloh, J., Jones, D., Lazarus, E., Lindeman, M., Stark, P.B.: Soba: Secrecy-preserving observable ballot-level audit. In: Proc. USENIX Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop (2011)
Cramer, R., Gennaro, R., Schoenmakers, B.: A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme. In: Fumy, W. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1997. LNCS, vol. 1233, pp. 103–118. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)
Chaum, D.: SureVote: Technical Overview. In: Proceedings of the Workshop on Trustworthy Elections, WOTE 2001 (2001)
Gjsteen, K.: Analysis of an internet voting protocol. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2010/380 (2010), http://eprint.iacr.org/
Heather, J., Ryan, P.Y.A., Teague, V.: Pretty good democracy for more expressive voting schemes. In: Gritzalis, D., Preneel, B., Theoharidou, M. (eds.) ESORICS 2010. LNCS, vol. 6345, pp. 405–423. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Jakobsson, M., Juels, A., Rivest, R.: Making Mix Nets Robust for Electronic Voting by Randomized Partial Checking. In: USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 339–353 (2002)
Jones, D.W., Simons, B.: Broken Ballots: Will Your Vote Count? University of Chicago Press (2012)
Moran, T., Naor, M.: Split-ballot voting: Everlasting privacy with distributed trust. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security 13, 16:1–16:43 (2010)
Ryan, P.Y.A., Teague, V.: Pretty Good Deomcracy. In: Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Workshop on Security Protocols 2009 (2013)
Rosen, A., Ta-shma, A., Riva, B., Ben-Nun, J.(Y.): Wombat voting system
Sako, K., Kilian, J.: Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme. In: Guillou, L.C., Quisquater, J.-J. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 1995. LNCS, vol. 921, pp. 393–403. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)
Zagórski, F., Carback, R.T., Chaum, D., Clark, J., Essex, A., Vora, P.L.: Remotegrity: Design and use of an end-to-end verifiable remote voting system. In: Jacobson, M., Locasto, M., Mohassel, P., Safavi-Naini, R. (eds.) ACNS 2013. LNCS, vol. 7954, pp. 441–457. Springer, Heidelberg (2013)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Benaloh, J., Ryan, P.Y.A., Teague, V. (2013). Verifiable Postal Voting. In: Christianson, B., Malcolm, J., Stajano, F., Anderson, J., Bonneau, J. (eds) Security Protocols XXI. Security Protocols 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8263. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41717-7_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41717-7_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-41716-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-41717-7
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)