Abstract
Decision making by a committee may be modelled by simple games. Some of committee’s members are equipped with a veto, i.e. they may stop an action temporarily or permanently (via transforming a winning coalition into a losing coalition). Classification of such games and of power indices is presented in the paper. Special emphasis is given to particular characteristics of winning coalitions and consequently to a priori power indices and their stability.
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Mercik, J. (2013). Classification of Committees with Veto and Stability of Power indices. In: Bǎdicǎ, C., Nguyen, N.T., Brezovan, M. (eds) Computational Collective Intelligence. Technologies and Applications. ICCCI 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8083. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40495-5_41
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40495-5_41
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