Abstract
We propose and implement a cryptographically end-to-end verifiable (E2E) remote voting system for absentee voters and report on its deployment in a binding municipal election in Takoma Park, Maryland. Remotegrity is a hybrid mail/internet extension to the Scantegrity in-person voting system, enabling secure, electronic return of vote-by-mail ballots. It provides voters with the ability to detect unauthorized modifications to their cast ballots made by either malicious client software, or a corrupt election authority—two threats not previously studied in combination. Not only can the voter detect such changes, they can prove it to a third party without giving up ballot secrecy.
Full version available: http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/214 . Zagórski was funded in part by NSF Awards 0937267 and 1137973 and by the Polish National Science Center (NCN) scientific project 2010-2013 with grant number N N206 369839. Clark and Essex acknowledge funding through NSERC PDF awards.
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Zagórski, F., Carback, R.T., Chaum, D., Clark, J., Essex, A., Vora, P.L. (2013). Remotegrity: Design and Use of an End-to-End Verifiable Remote Voting System. In: Jacobson, M., Locasto, M., Mohassel, P., Safavi-Naini, R. (eds) Applied Cryptography and Network Security. ACNS 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7954. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38980-1_28
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