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The Least Privacy-Damaging Centralised Traffic Data Retention Architecture

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Security Protocols XVII (Security Protocols 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7028))

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Abstract

We present a protocol that can be used by service providers to store traffic records centrally, while only making them readable to law enforcement after a proper authorisation has been issued and logged. Despite the system’s best efforts to prevent mass profiling and surveillance, we discuss how it is inherently fragile.

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Danezis, G. (2013). The Least Privacy-Damaging Centralised Traffic Data Retention Architecture. In: Christianson, B., Malcolm, J.A., Matyáš, V., Roe, M. (eds) Security Protocols XVII. Security Protocols 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7028. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36213-2_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36213-2_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-36212-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-36213-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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