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Approximability of Economic Equilibrium for Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses

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Graph-Theoretic Concepts in Computer Science (WG 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 6986))

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Abstract

In a modification of the classical model of housing market which includes duplicate houses, economic equilibrium might not exist. As a measure of approximation the value sat \(\mathcal(M)\) was proposed: the maximum number of satisfied agents in the market \(\mathcal(M)\), where an agent is said to be satisfied if, given a set of prices, he gets a most preferred house in his budget set. Clearly, market \(\mathcal(M)\) admits an economic equilibrium if sat(M) is equal to the total number n of agents, but sat\(\mathcal(M)\) is NP-hard to compute.

In this paper we give a 2-approximation algorithm for sat\(\mathcal(M)\) in the case of trichotomic preferences. On the other hand, we prove that sat\(\mathcal(M)\) is hard to approximate within a factor smaller than 21/19, even if each house type is used for at most two houses. If the preferences are not required to be trichotomic, the problem is hard to approximate within a factor smaller than 1.2. We also prove that, provided the Unique Games Conjecture is true, approximation is hard within a factor 1.25 for trichotomic preferences, and within a factor 1.5 in the case of general preferences.

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Cechlárová, K., Jelínková, E. (2011). Approximability of Economic Equilibrium for Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses. In: Kolman, P., Kratochvíl, J. (eds) Graph-Theoretic Concepts in Computer Science. WG 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6986. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25870-1_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25870-1_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-25869-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-25870-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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