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Memory Leakage-Resilient Encryption Based on Physically Unclonable Functions

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Towards Hardware-Intrinsic Security

Part of the book series: Information Security and Cryptography ((ISC))

Abstract

Modern cryptography provides a variety of tools and methodologies to analyze and to prove the security of cryptographic schemes such as in [6–9]. These proofs always start from a particular setting with a well-defined adversary

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Due to the lack of space, we consider here the simplest case, being a three rounds Luby–Rackoff cipher and a chosen-plaintext attackers.

  2. 2.

    Although the fuzzy extractor usually reduces the output length, such situation can exist if the output length of the PUF is bigger than the input length.

  3. 3.

    As the randomization is done for every encryption, we omit for simplicity the superscripts \((i)\) at the values.

  4. 4.

    The output of the first inverter is connected to the input of the second one and vice versa.

  5. 5.

    For example, choosing \({\ensuremath{\delta}}\) large enough such that \(\Pr[\hbox{more than} \delta \hbox{bit errors in}\;m \;\textrm{its}] \leq 10^{-9}\) will generally assure that more than \({\ensuremath{\delta}}\) bit errors will never occur in practice in a single response.

  6. 6.

    See, e.g., [39, 13] for a definition of a strong extractor. Typical seed lengths of strong extractors are in the order of 100 bits, and in most cases the same seed can be reused for all outputs.

  7. 7.

    By consequence, also no min-entropy on the PUF input is leaked.

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Acknowledgements

We thank Stefan Lucks for useful comments and discussions. The work of Berk Sunar was supported by the National Science Foundation Cybertrust grant No. CNS-0831416. The work of Roel Maes is funded by IWT-Flanders grant No. 71369 and is in part supported by the IAP Program P6/26 BCRYPT of the Belgian State and K.U.Leuven BOF funding (OT/06/04).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Horst Görtz Institute for IT Security, Ruhr-University Bochum, Bochum, Germany

    Frederik Armknecht & Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

  2. Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany

    Frederik Armknecht

  3. ESAT/COSIC and IBBT, Catholic University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

    Roel Maes

  4. Cryptography & Information Security, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA, USA

    Berk Sunar

  5. Intrinsic-ID Eindhoven, 5656 AE, Eindhoven, The Netherlands

    Pim Tuyls

  6. ESAT/COSIC and IBBT, Catholic University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

    Pim Tuyls

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Correspondence to Frederik Armknecht .

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  1. Horst Görtz Institut für, Sicherheit in der, Universität Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, Bochum, 44780, Germany

    Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

  2. Département d'informatique, Groupe de cryptographie, École normale supérieure, rue d'Ulm 45, Paris, 75230, France

    David Naccache

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Armknecht, F., Maes, R., Sadeghi, AR., Sunar, B., Tuyls, P. (2010). Memory Leakage-Resilient Encryption Based on Physically Unclonable Functions. In: Sadeghi, AR., Naccache, D. (eds) Towards Hardware-Intrinsic Security. Information Security and Cryptography. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14452-3_6

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