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On the Empirical Evaluation of Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions

  • Conference paper
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce and Trading Agent Design and Analysis (AMEC 2007, TADA 2007)

Abstract

Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions extend and generalise all the preceding types of combinatorial auctions. In this paper, we try to make headway on the practical application of MMUCAs by: (1) providing an algorithm to generate artificial data that is representative of the sort of scenarios a winner determination algorithm is likely to encounter; and (2) subsequently assessing the performance of an Integer Programming implementation of MMUCA on CPLEX.

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Vinyals, M., Cerquides, J. (2008). On the Empirical Evaluation of Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions. In: Collins, J., et al. Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce and Trading Agent Design and Analysis. AMEC TADA 2007 2007. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 13. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88713-3_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88713-3_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-88712-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-88713-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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