Abstract
It is a well known fact that only formal methods can provide a proof that a given system meets its requirements. For critical systems (e.g. nuclear reactors, aircraft), the use of these methods becomes mandatory. Electronic voting is also one of these critical systems since the stakes are important: democracy. In this context, we propose in this paper, the use of the ADM logic in order to specify security properties (fairness, eligibility, individual verifiability and universal verifiability) of electronic voting protocols. These properties are first specified in a general form, and then adapted to the FOO protocol as a case study. Our goal is to verify these properties against a trace-based model. The choice of the ADM logic is motivated by the fact that it offers several features that are useful for trace analysis. Moreover, the logic is endowed with a tableau-based proof system that leads to a local model checking which enables an efficient implementation.
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
Fujioka, A., Okamoto, T., Ohta, K.: A practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections. In: Seberry, J., Zheng, Y. (eds.) AUSCRYPT 1992. LNCS, vol. 718, pp. 244–251. Springer, Heidelberg (1993)
Juang, W.S., Lei, C.L.: A secure and practical electronic voting scheme for real world environments. TIEICE: IEICE Transactions on Communications/Electronics/Information and Systems (1997)
Okamoto, T.: Receipt-Free Electronic Voting Schemes for Large Scale Elections. In: Christianson, B., Lomas, M. (eds.) Security Protocols 1997. LNCS, vol. 1361, pp. 25–35. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
Benaloh, J.C.: Verifiable secret-ballot elections. PhD thesis, Yale University (1987)
Hirt, M., Sako, K.: Efficient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 539–556. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Adi, K., Debbabi, M., Mejri, M.: A new logic for electronic commerce protocols. Theoretical Computer Science 291(3), 223–283 (2003)
Stirling, C.: Modal and temporal logics for processes. In: Proceedings of the VIII Banff Higher order workshop conference on Logics for concurrency: structure versus automata, pp. 149–237. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)
Baskar, A., Ramanujam, R., Suresh, S.P.: Knowledge-based modelling of voting protocols. In: Proceedings of TARK 2007, pp. 62–71. ACM, New York (2007)
Chothia, T., Orzan, S., Pang, J., Dashti, M.T.: A framework for automatically checking anonymity with μ-CRL. In: TGC, pp. 301–318 (2006)
Delaune, S., Kremer, S., Ryan, M.: Coercion-resistance and receipt-freeness in electronic voting. In: Proceedings of CSFW 2006, pp. 28–42. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2006)
Eijck, J.V., Orzan, S.: Epistemic verification of anonymity. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 168, 159–174 (2007)
Jonker, H., Pieters, W.: Receipt-freeness as a special case of anonymity in epistemic logic. In: IAVoSS Workshop On Trustworthy Elections - WOTE 2006 (2006)
Kremer, S., Ryan, M.: Analysis of an electronic voting protocol in the applied Pi calculus. In: Sagiv, M. (ed.) ESOP 2005. LNCS, vol. 3444, pp. 186–200. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Mauw, S., Verschuren, J., de Vink, E.P.: Data anonymity in the FOO voting scheme. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 168, 5–28 (2007)
Bergstra, J.A., Klop, J.W.: Algebra of communicating processes with abstraction. Theoritical Computer Science 37, 77–121 (1985)
Abadi, M., Fournet, C.: Mobile values, new names, and secure communication. ACM SIGPLAN Notices 36(3), 104–115 (2001)
Huth, M., Ryan, M.: Logic in Computer Science: Modelling and Reasoning about Systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1999)
Pratt, V.R.: Application of modal logic to programming. Studia Logica 39(2-3), 257–274 (1980)
Chaum, D.: Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM 24(2), 84–90 (1981)
Paulson, L.C.: The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols. Journal of Computer Security 6(1-2), 85–128 (1998)
Dolev, D., Yao, A.C.C.: On the security of public key protocols. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 29(2), 198–207 (1981)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Talbi, M., Morin, B., Viet Triem Tong, V., Bouhoula, A., Mejri, M. (2008). Specification of Electronic Voting Protocol Properties Using ADM Logic: FOO Case Study. In: Chen, L., Ryan, M.D., Wang, G. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5308. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88625-9_27
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-88625-9_27
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-88624-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-88625-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)