Abstract
Traditionally, cryptographic algorithms provide security against an adversary who has only black box access to cryptographic devices. That is, the only thing the adversary can do is to query the cryptographic algorithm on inputs of its choice and analyze the responses, which are always computed according to the correct original secret information. However, such a model does not always correspond to the realities of physical implementations.
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© 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Standaert, FX., Malkin, T.G., Yung, M. (2008). Does Physical Security of Cryptographic Devices Need a Formal Study? (Invited Talk). In: Safavi-Naini, R. (eds) Information Theoretic Security. ICITS 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5155. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85093-9_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85093-9_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-85092-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-85093-9
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