Abstract
In this paper, we handle a negotiation method in which a main negotiation consists of multiple sub-negotiations. In items allocation for commerce, there are some risks on the trade because the market balance is determined by supply and demand. The result of main negotiation is also determined by the order of sub-negotiations and agents’ behaviors since agents’ budgets have limitations on the actual commercial trading. However, it is difficult to decide the order of negotiations, such as simultaneous decisions and rotations. In this paper, we give the trading model in such cases, that is, agents purchase items by pooled buying. In actual trading as pooled buying, items are sold by the volume discount. Concretely, we discuss joint-stock company and private limited partnership on the web. In the negotiation phase, an agent proposes pooled buying based on the number of items and their prices considering their budgets. The degree of risks is calculated. All agents can see the risks with each item. Agents cooperate to the proposing agent based on the degree of risks. In this paper, we give two scenarios for trading. One is to avoid free riders who get surplus without risks. Another one is to promote agents’ participation to increase social surplus. For risk aversion and promoting cooperation, we employ the side-payment policy, that is, cooperative agents’ risks are preserved to a minimum. Further, we give some discussions where agents must pay the negotiation costs and charge for storage.
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Matsuo, T. (2007). A New Pooled Buying Method Based on Risk Management. In: Okuno, H.G., Ali, M. (eds) New Trends in Applied Artificial Intelligence. IEA/AIE 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 4570. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73325-6_95
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73325-6_95
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-73322-5
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