Abstract
In the context of general demand cost sharing, we present the first group-strategyproof mechanisms for the metric fault tolerant uncapacitated facility location problem. They are \((3 \ensuremath{L})\)-budget-balanced and \((3 \ensuremath{L} \cdot (1 + \mathcal H_n))\)-efficient, where \(\ensuremath{L}\) is the maximum service level and n is the number of agents. These mechanisms generalize the seminal Moulin mechanisms for binary demand. We also apply this approach to the generalized Steiner problem in networks.
This work was partially supported by the IST Program of the European Union under contract number IST-15964 (AEOLUS).
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Bleischwitz, Y., Schoppmann, F. (2008). Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing for Metric Fault Tolerant Facility Location. In: Monien, B., Schroeder, UP. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4997. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_31
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_31
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