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Anonymous Communication with On-line and Off-line Onion Encoding

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SOFSEM 2005: Theory and Practice of Computer Science (SOFSEM 2005)

Abstract

Anonymous communication with onions requires that a user application determines the whole routing path of an onion. This scenario has certain disadvantages, it might be dangerous in some situations, and it does not fit well to the current layered architecture of dynamic communication networks.

We show that applying encoding based on universal re-encryption can solve many of these problems by providing much flexibility – the onions can be created on-the-fly or in advance by different parties.

Partially supported by the EU within the 6th Framework Programme under contract 001907 (DELIS).

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Klonowski, M., Kutyłowski, M., Zagórski, F. (2005). Anonymous Communication with On-line and Off-line Onion Encoding. In: Vojtáš, P., Bieliková, M., Charron-Bost, B., Sýkora, O. (eds) SOFSEM 2005: Theory and Practice of Computer Science. SOFSEM 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3381. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30577-4_26

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30577-4_26

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-24302-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-30577-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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