Security of Shen et al.’s Timestamp-Based Password Authentication Scheme

Recently, Shen et al. proposed an improvement on Yang-Shieh’s timestamp-based password authentication scheme using smart cards. Then they claimed that their scheme cannot withstand a forged login attack, but also eliminate a problem of Yang-Shieh’s. However, their scheme is still susceptible to forged login attack. In this paper, we show how the forged login attack can be worked out on Shen et al.’s scheme and present an enhancement to resolve such a problem.

Authors and Affiliations

1. Department of Computer Engineering, Kyungpook National University, Daegu, 702-701, South Korea

   Eun-Jun Yoon, Eun-Kyung Ryu & Kee-Young Yoo

Editors and Affiliations

1. Department of Chemistry, University of Perugia, Via Elce di Sotto, 8, I-06123, Perugia, Italy

   Antonio Laganá

2. Department of Computer Science, University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive N.W., T2N 1N4, Calgary, AB, Canada

   Marina L. Gavrilova

3. William Norris Professor, Head of the Computer Science and Engineering Department, University of Minnesota, USA

   Vipin Kumar

4. School of Computing, Soongsil University, Seoul, Korea

   Youngsong Mun

5. OptimaNumerics Ltd., Cathedral House, 23-31 Waring Street, BT1 2DX, Belfast, UK

   C. J. Kenneth Tan

6. Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Perugia, via Vanvitelli, 1, I-06123, Perugia, Italy

   Osvaldo Gervasi

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