Abstract
Generally, a piece of information (key, password, etc.) is classified as secret when it gives to its owner some privileges or protections. For instance, cryptographic keys can be used for several purposes such as to prove our identity (authentication), to keep our anonymity, to protect our data against malicious manipulation, etc. The secrecy property within cryptographic protocols is generally defined as follows : A given protocol P keeps a message M (M can be a key) secret, if an intruder will not be able to reveal the value of M during any execution of this protocol.
In this paper, we prove that some cryptographic protocols can involve the following amazing situation: the intruder can never discover the value of a given key k but he is able to both encrypt and decrypt any message using this key k. We baptize this kind of awful cryptographic protocols by chaotic protocols. This fact has been discovered when analyzing the one-way Woo and Lam authentication protocol using the Dymna approach which is specially developed for the verification of cryptographic protocols. Abadi and Needham present an attack against this protocol and proposed a new corrected version . Surprisingly, we prove in this paper that the new proposed version is also a chaotic protocol. Finally, some interesting features of chaotic protocols are discussed in this paper.
This research is supported by a research grant from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Council of Canada, NSERC, the ”Fonds Qébécois de la Recherche sur la Nature et les Technologies”, FQRNT, and ”Commission Permanente de Coopération Franco-Québécoise”, CPCFQ.
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Mejri, M. (2004). Chaotic Protocols. In: Laganá, A., Gavrilova, M.L., Kumar, V., Mun, Y., Tan, C.J.K., Gervasi, O. (eds) Computational Science and Its Applications – ICCSA 2004. ICCSA 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3043. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24707-4_106
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24707-4_106
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