Abstract
As the IoT era comes to the full-fledged, hardware Trojans that involve malicious modifications of circuitry are becoming a growing security concern. To avoid a detection mechanism, hardware Trojans may need a stealthy nature in their existence for being dormant, and even when triggered. In this paper, we devise a new hardware Trojan concept that exploits natural glitches and their control mechanisms for information leakage in a stealthy manner. We indeed reversely exploit the glitch control mechanisms to be bypassed when triggered, and try to recall the natural glitches for the purpose. An adversary who triggered the hardware Trojan may infer multiple input values from a single output of the target logic, thereby obtaining multiple outputs of the preceding logics, by monitoring the existence of the natural glitches. We perform experiments and discuss the results and threats, not to be neglected, along with a possible mitigation.
This work was supported by Defense Acquisition Program Administration and Agency for Defense Development under the contract (UD160066BD).
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Joh, J., Seo, Y., Kim, HK., Kwon, T. (2018). Glitch Recall: A Hardware Trojan Exploiting Natural Glitches in Logic Circuits. In: Kang, B., Kim, T. (eds) Information Security Applications. WISA 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10763. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93563-8_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93563-8_13
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