Abstract
We present a Side-Channel Analysis Platform (SCAP) Framework developed to acquire and study the traces derived from a cryptographic device when cryptographic computations are done. The main goal of this work is to develop a tool for performing side-channel attacks against these cryptographic devices. The characteristics of the SCAP Framework are described and a case study with a smartphone is presented.
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Acknowledgments
This work has been partly supported by Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) under the projects TIN2014-55325-C2-1-R (ProCriCiS), TIN2013-46469-R (SPINY), TIN2016-79095-C2-2-R (SMOG-DEV), and by Comunidad de Madrid (Spain) under the project S2013/ICE-3095-CM (CIBERDINE), cofinanced with the European Union FEDER funds. We thank National Instruments for its support.
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Blanco Blanco, A. et al. (2018). A Framework for Acquiring and Analyzing Traces from Cryptographic Devices. In: Lin, X., Ghorbani, A., Ren, K., Zhu, S., Zhang, A. (eds) Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. SecureComm 2017. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 239. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78816-6_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78816-6_20
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