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Towards Fair and Efficient Evaluations of Leaking Cryptographic Devices

Overview of the ERC Project CRASH, Part I (Invited Talk)

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Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering (SPACE 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 10076))

Abstract

Side-channel analysis is an important concern for the security of cryptographic implementations, and may lead to powerful key recovery attacks if no countermeasures are deployed. Therefore, various types of protection mechanisms have been proposed over the last 20 years. In view of the cost and performance overheads caused by these protections, their fair evaluation is a primary concern for hardware and software designers. Yet, the physical nature of side-channel analysis also renders the security evaluation of cryptographic implementations very different than the one of cryptographic algorithms against mathematical cryptanalysis. That is, while the latter can be quantified based on (well-defined) time, data and memory complexities, the evaluation of side-channel analysis additionally requires to quantify the informativeness and exploitability of the physical leakages. This implies that a part of these security evaluations is inherently heuristic and dependent on engineering expertise.

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Acknowledgements

François-Xavier Standaert is a research associate of the Belgian Fund for Scientific Research (F.R.S.-FNRS). This work has been funded in part by the European Commission through the ERC project 280141. The author is highly grateful to the SPACE 2016 organizers for inviting him to give this talk, and allowing him to amortize the load of his final project report.

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  1. ICTEAM Institute, Crypto Group, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    François-Xavier Standaert

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Correspondence to François-Xavier Standaert .

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  1. Universities of Paris 8 and Paris 13, LAGA, Paris, France

    Claude Carlet

  2. University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

    M. Anwar Hasan

  3. CRRao AIMSCS, Hyderabad, India

    Vishal Saraswat

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Standaert, FX. (2016). Towards Fair and Efficient Evaluations of Leaking Cryptographic Devices. In: Carlet, C., Hasan, M., Saraswat, V. (eds) Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering. SPACE 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10076. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-49445-6_20

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