Abstract
Correspondingly, Android also becomes a common attack target. Till now, many attacks have been detected out, such as confused deputy attack, collusion attack, and root exploits attack. In this paper, we present a novel attack, denoted as transplantation attack. Transplantation attack, when being applied to spy on user, can make the malicious behavior more stealthy. The attack can evade permission check, evade device administration, and even evade API auditing. The premise of carrying out Transplantation attack is that malware is able to access resources or gain access capability. By fulfilling the premise, we do a case study about Camera device. The result indicates that Transplantation attack indeed exists. Based on these observations, we predict the kind of system resources that may suffer transplantation attack. Defence discussion are also presented.
This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China grant 70890084/G021102 and 61003274, Strategy Pilot Project of Chinese Academy of Sciences sub-project XDA06010702, and National High Technology Research and Development Program of China (863 Program, No. 2013AA01A214 and 2012AA013104).
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Zhang, Z., Xiang, J., Wang, L., Lei, L. (2015). Transplantation Attack: Analysis and Prediction. In: Tian, J., Jing, J., Srivatsa, M. (eds) International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. SecureComm 2014. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 153. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23802-9_28
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-23802-9_28
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