Abstract
The need to assess security and take protection decisions is at least as old as our civilisation. However, the complexity and development speed of our interconnected technical systems have surpassed our capacity to imagine and evaluate risk scenarios. This holds in particular for risks that are caused by the strategic behaviour of adversaries. Therefore, technology-supported methods are needed to help us identify and manage these risks. In this paper, we describe the attack navigator: a graph-based approach to security risk assessment inspired by navigation systems. Based on maps of a socio-technical system, the attack navigator identifies routes to an attacker goal. Specific attacker properties such as skill or resources can be included through attacker profiles. This enables defenders to explore attack scenarios and the effectiveness of defense alternatives under different threat conditions.
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Acknowledgment
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under grant agreement no. 318003 (TRE\(_\mathrm {S}\)PASS). This publication reflects only the authors’ views and the Union is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained herein.
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Probst, C.W., Willemson, J., Pieters, W. (2016). The Attack Navigator. In: Mauw, S., Kordy, B., Jajodia, S. (eds) Graphical Models for Security. GraMSec 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9390. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29968-6_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29968-6_1
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