Abstract
Hidden service is a very important feature of Tor, which supports server operators to provide a variety of Internet services without revealing their locations. A large number of users rely on Tor hidden services to protect their anonymity. Around 30,000 servers are running hidden services every day [21]. However, hidden services are particularly vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks especially when the entry guard of a hidden server is compromised by an adversary. In this paper, we propose a multipath routing scheme for Tor hidden servers (mTorHS) to defend against traffic analysis attacks. By transferring data through multiple circuits between the hidden server and a special server rendezvous point (SRP), mTorHS is able to exploit flow splitting and flow merging to eliminate inter-cell correlations of the original flow. Experiments on the Shadow simulator [11] show that our scheme can effectively mitigate the risk of traffic analysis even when robust watermarking techniques are used.
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Yang, L., Li, F. (2015). Enhancing Traffic Analysis Resistance for Tor Hidden Services with Multipath Routing. In: Thuraisingham, B., Wang, X., Yegneswaran, V. (eds) Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. SecureComm 2015. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 164. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28865-9_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28865-9_20
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