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The Lifetime of Android API Vulnerabilities: Case Study on the JavaScript-to-Java Interface

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Security Protocols XXIII (Security Protocols 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9379))

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Abstract

We examine the lifetime of API vulnerabilities on Android and propose an exponential decay model of the uptake of updates after the release of a fix. We apply our model to a case study of the JavaScript-to-Java interface vulnerability. This vulnerability allows untrusted JavaScript in a WebView to break out of the JavaScript sandbox allowing remote code execution on Android phones; this can often then be further exploited to gain root access. While this vulnerability was first publicly disclosed in December 2012, we predict that the fix will not have been deployed to 95% of devices until December 2017, 5.17 years after the release of the fix. We show how this vulnerability is exploitable in many apps and the role that ad-libraries have in making this flaw so widespread.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We have made these available [13].

  2. 2.

    https://codereview.chromium.org/213693005/patch/20001/30001 committed as 261801 or afae5d83d66c1d041a1fa433fbb087c5cc604b67 or e55966f4c3773a24fe46f9bab60ab3a3fc19abaf.

References

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by a Google focussed research award; and the EPSRC [grant number EP/P505445/1]. Some of the raw data and source code is available [15]; the analysed APKs are not included as we do not have distribution rights for them. Thanks to Robert N.M. Watson for his insight and useful feedback.

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Correspondence to Daniel R. Thomas .

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Thomas, D.R., Beresford, A.R., Coudray, T., Sutcliffe, T., Taylor, A. (2015). The Lifetime of Android API Vulnerabilities: Case Study on the JavaScript-to-Java Interface. In: Christianson, B., Švenda, P., Matyáš, V., Malcolm, J., Stajano, F., Anderson, J. (eds) Security Protocols XXIII. Security Protocols 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9379. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26096-9_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26096-9_13

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