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A Double Auction Mechanism for On-Demand Transport Networks

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PRIMA 2015: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems (PRIMA 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 9387))

Abstract

Market mechanisms play a key role in allocating and pricing commuters and drivers in new on-demand transport services such as Uber, and Liftago in Prague. These services successfully use different mechanisms, which suggests a need to understand the behavior of a range of mechanisms within the context of on-demand transport. In this paper, we propose a double auction mechanism and compare its performance to a mechanism inspired by Liftago’s approach. We show that our mechanism can improve efficiency and satisfy key properties such as weak budget balance and truthfulness.

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Correspondence to Martin Schaefer .

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© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Egan, M., Schaefer, M., Jakob, M., Oren, N. (2015). A Double Auction Mechanism for On-Demand Transport Networks. In: Chen, Q., Torroni, P., Villata, S., Hsu, J., Omicini, A. (eds) PRIMA 2015: Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems. PRIMA 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9387. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25524-8_38

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-25524-8_38

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-25523-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-25524-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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