Abstract
In the context of sharing economy, establishing a stable alliance is crucial in the logistics service industry. Consequently, the challenge of ensuring fair profit allocation arises within the coalition of logistics enterprises. However, due to the presence of incomplete information in the coalition, some traditional point-valued solutions of cooperative games, such as the Shapley value, may be inadequate. These solutions are more proper for cooperative games where accurate estimate of both the general profit of the alliance and the participation level are feasible. In this study, we address the issue of profit allocation for logistics enterprise coalitions with incomplete information and propose a relevant profit allocation model. To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed model, a case study is provided. The results show that the fuzzy Shapley value significantly enhances the multi-party cooperation and can serves as an effective tool for the fair and equitable allocation of profits within logistics enterprise coalitions.
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Acknowledgments
This work is funded by Ministry of Science and Technology 2022 program “Research and Application Demonstration of Industrial Internet Service Platform” (No. 2023YFB3308700).
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© 2024 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
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He, X., Yang, S., Huang, S. (2024). Profit Allocation in Logistics Enterprise Coalitions Based on Fuzzy Cooperative Game Theory. In: Luo, Y. (eds) Cooperative Design, Visualization, and Engineering. CDVE 2024. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 15158. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71315-6_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71315-6_16
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