Abstract
Vehicle Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) play a pivotal role in intelligent transportation systems, offering dynamic communication between vehicles, road side units, and the internet. Given the open-access nature of VANETs and the associated threats, such as impersonation and privacy violations, ensuring the security of these communications is of utmost importance. This paper presents the Identity-based Cluster Authentication and Key Exchange (ID-CAKE) scheme, a new approach to address security challenges in VANETs. The ID-CAKE scheme integrates the Cluster Consensus Identity-based Identification (CCIBI) with Zero-Knowledge (ZK) proof and the Identity-based Multi-receiver Key Exchange Mechanism (ID-mKEM) signature scheme. This integration provides robust authorization via CCIBI, while the ID-mKEM signature ensures message integrity, and guarantees both non-repudiation and unforgeability through mKEM for message broadcasting. The scheme employs a novel three-party ZK proof for batch verification using mKEM, which significantly reduces computational burdens. Our scheme also ensures anonymity and unlinkability by introducing pseudo-identities to all users in the cluster. The rigorous security proof provided confirms the resilience of the ID-CAKE scheme against potential attacks, adhering to the different scenarios, against the hardness of the elliptic curve computational diffie-hellman under the random oracle model. The ID-CAKE scheme establishes a robust security framework for VANETs, and its introduction highlights potential pathways for future exploration in the realm of VANET security.
Apurva K Vangujar and Alia Umrani are supported by PhD scholarships funded by the Science Foundation Ireland Centre under Grant number 18/CRT/6222. This research has also been supported by Science Foundation Ireland under Grant number 13/RC/2077_P2.
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Notes
- 1.
\(\textsf{d}\) of all the identities for each available \(\textsf{ID}\) can be calculated with the same technique described in the \(\textsf{Extract}\) algorithm of the CCIBI scheme.
- 2.
Communication cost refers to the total size of message transmitted. According to [16], for type A pairing with respect to 80 bit security level, the size of p is equal to 64 bytes, A point on the group of points \(E(F_q)\) consists of x and y coordinates. This means that the size of each element in \(\mathbb {G}_1\) is \(64 \times 2 = 128\) bytes whilst that of each element in \(\mathbb {G}_2\) is \(20 \times 2 = 40\) bytes. In addition, the size for a general hash H function in \(\mathbb {Z}^*_q\), a expiration, and a timestamp are considered to be 20 bytes, 4 bytes, and 4 bytes, respectively. As the basic configuration information is the same for above schemes, we ignore the size of message and only take into account the size of the signature on the message with the corresponding \(\mathsf {PID_{s_{i}}}\).
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Vangujar, A.K., Umrani, A., Palmieri, P. (2024). Identity-Based Cluster Authentication and Key Exchange (ID-CAKE) Message Broadcasting and Batch Verification in VANETs. In: Andreoni, M. (eds) Applied Cryptography and Network Security Workshops. ACNS 2024. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14587. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-61489-7_10
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