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Mind the TWEAKEY Schedule: Cryptanalysis on SKINNYe-64-256

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Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2022 (ASIACRYPT 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13791))

Abstract

Designing symmetric ciphers for particular applications becomes a hot topic. At EUROCRYPT 2020, Naito, Sasaki and Sugawara invented the threshold implementation friendly cipher SKINNYe-64-256 to meet the requirement of the authenticated encryption PFB \(\_\)Plus. Soon, Thomas Peyrin pointed out that SKINNYe-64-256 may lose the security expectation due the new tweakey schedule. Although the security issue of SKINNYe-64-256 is still unclear, Naito et al. decided to introduce SKINNYe-64-256 v2 as a response.

In this paper, we give a formal cryptanalysis on the new tweakey schedule of SKINNYe-64-256 and discover unexpected differential cancellations in the tweakey schedule. For example, we find the number of cancellations can be up to 8 within 30 consecutive rounds, which is significantly larger than the expected 3 cancellations. Moreover, we take our new discoveries into rectangle, MITM and impossible differential attacks, and adapt the corresponding automatic tools with new constraints from our discoveries. Finally, we find a 41-round related-tweakey rectangle attack on SKINNYe-64-256 and leave a security margin of 3 rounds only.

As STK accepts arbitrary tweakey size, but SKINNY and SKINNYe-64-256 v2 only support up to 4n tweakey size. We introduce a new design of tweakey schedule for SKINNY-64 to further extend the supported tweakey size. We give a formal proof that our new tweakey schedule inherits the security requirement of STK and SKINNY. We also discuss possible ways to extend the tweakey size for SKINNY-128.

The full version of the paper is available at https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/789.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For TK-z, if the size of internal state is n, the size of tweakey will be zn.

  2. 2.

    The number of possible values of \(STK^{(36)}_3\) is computed via Table 6. For example, in line 6 of Table 6, \(\{ETK^{(0)}_{11},STK^{(38)}_7,STK^{(40)}_1\}\) \(\in k_b\cup k'_f\) derived from the 6-th nibble have already been guessed, so the number of possible values of \(STK^{(36)}_3\) is \(|Im(A_{\{0,3,4,5\}})|/|Im(A_{\{0,4,5\}})|=2^{15-12}=2^{3}\). Similarly, we compute all the number of possible values for subtweakey cells involved in the guess and filter procedure, which are listed in Table 7.

  3. 3.

    As shown in line 5 of Table 6, with \(STK^{(36)}_7\) deduced in step C and other cells guessed in \(k_b\cup k'_f\), the number of possible values is only 1 for \(STK^{(34)}_3\).

  4. 4.

    Similar issue happens to Lilliput-AE [1], one of the first-round candidates at the NIST competition, specifies TBCs with up to \(z=7\). However, they also ignored the rationale of the original tweakey framework to ensure the security, and were actually attacked practically [32].

  5. 5.

    The area of the trade-off implementation mainly includes the circuit for \(\boldsymbol{L}\) and \(\boldsymbol{L}^2\) and two 4-bit registers. In area optimization implementation, the area is the circuit of \(\boldsymbol{L}\) and one 4-bit register. Assume the registers bound the area, we can say trade-off method costs double area.

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Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers from ASIACRYPT 2022 for their valuable comments. This work is supported by National Key R &D Program of China (2018YFA0704701), the Major Program of Guangdong Basic and Applied Research (2019B030302008), Natural Science Foundation of China (62272257, 61902207, 62072270, 62072207), Major Scientific and Technological Innovation Project of Shandong Province, China (2020ZLYS09 and 2019JZZY010133), Natural Science Foundation of Shanghai (19ZR1420000), and Open Foundation of Network and Data Security Key Laboratory of Sichuan Province (University of Electronic Science and Technology of China).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. BNRist, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

    Lingyue Qin

  2. Institute for Advanced Study, BNRist, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

    Xiaoyang Dong, Anyu Wang, Jialiang Hua & Xiaoyun Wang

  3. Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security (Ministry of Education), School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University, Qingdao, China

    Xiaoyun Wang

  4. Shangdong Institute of Blockchain, Jinan, China

    Anyu Wang & Xiaoyun Wang

  5. Zhongguancun Laboratory, Beijing, China

    Lingyue Qin, Xiaoyang Dong, Anyu Wang & Xiaoyun Wang

  6. National Financial Cryptography Research Center, Beijing, China

    Lingyue Qin, Xiaoyang Dong, Anyu Wang & Xiaoyun Wang

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  1. Lingyue Qin
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Correspondence to Xiaoyang Dong , Anyu Wang , Jialiang Hua or Xiaoyun Wang .

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  1. Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, India

    Shweta Agrawal

  2. Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Dongdai Lin

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Qin, L., Dong, X., Wang, A., Hua, J., Wang, X. (2022). Mind the TWEAKEY Schedule: Cryptanalysis on SKINNYe-64-256. In: Agrawal, S., Lin, D. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2022. ASIACRYPT 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13791. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22963-3_10

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