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Transport Layer Security

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Guide to Internet Cryptography

Part of the book series: Information Security and Cryptography ((ISC))

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Abstract

At the time of writing, TLS version 1.2 is the only version supported by all websites. This is one of the reasons why we chose version 1.2 for a detailed analysis of TLS. The second reason is that all attacks on TLS published so far cannot be understood without a thorough knowledge of the TLS blueprint underlying version 1.2. We start with an overview of the complex ecosystem of TLS, including its architecture and methods to activate TLS. We continue with the encryption layer, the TLS record layer. The TLS handshake is the most complex part of TLS, and we devote several sections to it: After a quick overview, we explain the central concept of ciphersuites. Then we look closely at all handshake messages and their role in the protocol. This section also details key derivation and the cryptography of the two main handshake families. Alert messages and the two variants of the TLS handshake, TLS session resumption and TLS renegotiation, are also part of the standard. TLS extenions and various HTTP headers modifying TLS standard behavior are specified in separate RFCs. The most fundamental change in TLS functionality is Datagram TLS (DTLS) which adapts TLS to UDP-based traffic. An extensive related work section and exercises conclude this chapter.

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  1. Chair for Network and Data Security, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany

    Jörg Schwenk

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Schwenk, J. (2022). Transport Layer Security. In: Guide to Internet Cryptography. Information Security and Cryptography. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19439-9_10

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