Abstract
Ad reservation market is an important part of the Internet advertising industry. Advertisers expect to reserve ad slots in advance, while auctioneers need a mechanism for allocating ad slots and maximizing profits. We propose SMAR, which is a Strategy-proof Model-based online Auction for ad Reservation, to meet their needs. SMAR allows the cancelation policy. It means auctioneers can revoke the reservation and resell ad slots to advertisers with higher bids. SMAR achieves both incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We implement SMAR and compare it with offline VCG and other related works. The results show SMAR has a better performance in both social welfare and revenue.
This work was supported in part by the National Key R&D Program of China 2018YFB1004703, in part by China NSF grant 61672348 and 61672353, in part by Supported by the Open Project Program of the State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced Computing 2018A09, and in part by Alibaba Group through Alibaba Innovation Research Program. The opinions, findings, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the funding agencies or the government.
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Li, Q., Wu, F., Chen, G. (2019). A Strategy-Proof Model-Based Online Auction for Ad Reservation. In: Nayak, A., Sharma, A. (eds) PRICAI 2019: Trends in Artificial Intelligence. PRICAI 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11670. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29908-8_48
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29908-8_48
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