Abstract
Network segregation is key to the security of the Internet of Things but also to the security of more traditional critical infrastructures or SCADA systems that need to be more and more connected and allow for remote operations. We believe traditional firewalls or data diodes are not sufficient considering the new issues at stake and that a new generation of filters is needed to replace or complement existing protections in these fields.
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Notes
- 1.
SCADA: Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition, a type of industrial control system.
- 2.
See the list of existing certified firewalls https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/pps/.
- 3.
The control of outgoing responses is less sensitive but still makes attacks more difficult and is also useful in case confidentially is at stake.
- 4.
V2X: Vehicle-to-everything communication.
- 5.
The lack of availability that would result from a successful attack on the protocol stacks can be mitigated by adding complementary security applications running in parallel to detect such attacks (such as a specialized IDS, i.e. Intrusion Detection System) and providing a security application in charge of reloading a new update over the air (or even inspect and repair the other software components). This is not featured here as it is out of scope of the current paper.
- 6.
IPS : Intrusion Prevention System.
- 7.
That is, a disjoint union of types, each one being introduced by a constructor.
- 8.
Constructor names are in particular used to define some operations depending on which constructor case a variant value belongs to.
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Érika Baëna and Horace Blanc for their valuable contribution to the work presented in Sect. 4.1.
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Bolignano, D., Plateau, F. (2018). Security Filters for IoT Domain Isolation. In: Margaria, T., Steffen, B. (eds) Leveraging Applications of Formal Methods, Verification and Validation. Industrial Practice. ISoLA 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11247. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03427-6_17
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