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Interchangeable Strategies in Games without Side Payments on the Base of Uncertain Information on Resources

  • Conference paper
Biometrics, Computer Security Systems and Artificial Intelligence Applications

Abstract

The test of use of elements modern theory of utility was undertaken to solving the corporate problems connected from distributing the supplies. Interchangeable strategy treats to patent medicines accumulating supplies and administering them, The utility function permits to estimate players preferences or simply their need. The problem of using of the utility function is not the issue the explicitly determined owing to fact, that there is possibility of manipulating of utility parameters. Therefore selection of these parameters in such way to optimize the quality (the satisfaction) of reached compromise is the purpose of the proposed methodology. The considering the possible divisions of supplies is one of aspects of optimization. Another aspect it is the optimal selection, with point of sight of quality compromise, levels of parameters of utility function. It is possible to take into consideration both aspects thanks for using Solvers which algorithms, in many original modifications, were introduced in work “Applied Interval Analysis” (authors: Jaulin L., Kieffer M., Didrit O., Walter E.). This fuzzy or interval character of parameters of the utility function or level of supplies is comfortable, approximate to reality, and also elastic with point of sight of optimization the form of interpretation of input data.

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Piech, H., Ptak, A., Machura, M. (2006). Interchangeable Strategies in Games without Side Payments on the Base of Uncertain Information on Resources. In: Saeed, K., Pejaś, J., Mosdorf, R. (eds) Biometrics, Computer Security Systems and Artificial Intelligence Applications. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-36503-9_25

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-36503-9_25

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-387-36232-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-387-36503-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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