Abstract
In this work, we consider the public facility allocation problem decided through a voting process uner the majority rule. A locations of the public facility is a majority rule winner if there is no other location in the network where more than half of the voters would have be closer to than the majority rule winner. We develop fast algorithms for interesting cases with nice combinatorial structures. We show that the general problem, where the number of public facilities is more than one and is consider part of the input size, is NP-hard. Finally, we discuss majority rule decision making for related models.
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Chen, L., Deng, X., Fang, Q., Tian, F. (2003). Majority Equilibrium for Public Facility Allocation. In: Warnow, T., Zhu, B. (eds) Computing and Combinatorics. COCOON 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2697. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45071-8_44
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45071-8_44
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