Abstract
In this paper we extend the ideas for differential fault attacks on the RSA cryptosystem (see [4]) to schemes using elliptic curves. We present three different types of attacks that can be used to derive information about the secret key if bit errors can be inserted into the elliptic curve computations in a tamper-proof device. The effectiveness of the attacks was proven in a software simulation of the described ideas.
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Biehl, I., Meyer, B., Müller, V. (2000). Differential Fault Attacks on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems. In: Bellare, M. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO 2000. CRYPTO 2000. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1880. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44598-6_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44598-6_8
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