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Cryptographic Primitives Enforcing Communication and Storage Complexity

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Financial Cryptography (FC 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 2357))

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Abstract

We introduce a new type of cryptographic primitives which enforce high communication or storage complexity. To evaluate these primitives on a random input, one has to engage in a protocol of high communication complexity, or one has to use a lot of storage. Therefore, the ability to compute these primitives constitutes a certain “proof of work,” since the computing party is forced to contribute a lot of its communication or storage resources to this task. Such primitives can be used in applications which deal with non-malicious but selfishly resource-maximizing parties. For example, they can be useful in constructing peer-to-peer systems which are robust against so called “free riders.” In this paper we define two such primitives, a communication-enforcing signature and a storage-enforcing commitment scheme, and we give constructions for both.

Supported By Stanford Graduate Fellowship.

Supported by NSF contract #CCR-9732754.

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Golle, P., Jarecki, S., Mironov, I. (2003). Cryptographic Primitives Enforcing Communication and Storage Complexity. In: Blaze, M. (eds) Financial Cryptography. FC 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2357. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00646-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36504-4

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