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A Simulation of the Market for Offenses in Multiagent Systems: Is Zero Crime Rates Attainable?

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Multi-Agent-Based Simulation II (MABS 2002)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 2581))

Abstract

The equilibrium of the market for offenses is studied by means of a multi-agent based simulation. The results show more detailed properties of the market’s equilibrium compared to the theoretical results derived by Fender [8]. Some preliminary results are described.

Agents may adopt random/mixed strategies, which violate the rational choice theory.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Saskatchewan, SK S7N5A9, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, CANADA

    Pinata Winoto

Authors
  1. Pinata Winoto
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Polytechnical School Computer Engineering Department Intelligent Techniques Laboratory, University of São Paulo, Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto, 158, travessa 3, 05424-970, São Paulo, Brazil

    Jaime Simão Sichman

  2. IRRI-Cirad, P.O. Box 9-159, Chatuchak, 10900, Bangkok, Thailand

    Françcois Bousquet

  3. Department of Software Engineering and Computer Science, Blekinge Institute of Technology, P.O. Box 520, 372 25, Ronneby, Sweden

    Paul Davidsson

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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Winoto, P. (2003). A Simulation of the Market for Offenses in Multiagent Systems: Is Zero Crime Rates Attainable?. In: Simão Sichman, J., Bousquet, F., Davidsson, P. (eds) Multi-Agent-Based Simulation II. MABS 2002. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 2581. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36483-8_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36483-8_13

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00607-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-36483-2

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