Efficient Password-Authenticated Key Exchange for Three-Party Secure Against Undetectable On-Line Dictionary Attacks

A password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol in the three-party setting allows two users communicating over a public network to agree on a common session key by the help of a server. In the setting the users do not share a password between themselves, but only with the server. In this paper, we explore the possibility of designing a round-efficient three-party PAKE protocol with a method to protect against undetectable on-line dictionary attacks without using the random oracle. The protocol matches the most efficient three-party PAKE protocol secure against undetectable on-line dictionary attacks among those found in the literature while providing the same level of security. Finally, we indentify the relations between detectable on-line and undetectable on-line dictionary attacks by providing counter-examples to support the observed relations.

Authors and Affiliations

1. Department of Computer Science and Communication Engineering, Kyushu University, Japan

   Jeong Ok Kwon & Kouichi Sakurai

2. Center for Information Security Technologies (CIST), Korea University, Korea

   Jeong Ok Kwon & Dong Hoon Lee

Editors and Affiliations

1. Advanced Computing and Emerging Technologies Centre, The School of Systems Engineering, University of Reading, RG6 6AY, Reading, United Kingdom

   Vassil N. Alexandrov

2. Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Amsterdam, Kruislaan 403, 1098, Amsterdam, SJ, The Netherlands

   Geert Dick van Albada

3. Faculty of Sciences, Section of Computational Science, University of Amsterdam, Kruislaan 403, 1098, Amsterdam, SJ, The Netherlands

   Peter M. A. Sloot

4. Computer Science Department, University of Tennessee, 37996-3450, Knoxville, TN, USA

   Jack Dongarra

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© 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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