Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the link between logics of games and “mentalistic” logics of rational agency, in which agents are characterized in terms of attitudes such as belief, desire and intention. In particular, we investigate the possibility of extending the logics of games with the notion of agents’ intentions (in the sense of Cohen and Levesque’s BDI theory). We propose a new operator (straσ) that can be used to formalize reasoning about outcomes of strategies in game-like scenarios. We briefly discuss the relationship between intentions and goals in this new framework, and show how to capture dynamic logic-like constructs. Finally, we demonstrate how game-theoretical concepts like Nash equilibrium can be expressed to reason about rational intentions and their consequences.
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Jamroga, W., van der Hoek, W., Wooldridge, M. (2005). Intentions and Strategies in Game-Like Scenarios. In: Bento, C., Cardoso, A., Dias, G. (eds) Progress in Artificial Intelligence. EPIA 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 3808. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11595014_51
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11595014_51
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