Abstract
This paper deals with the riding behavior of commuters who take trains from a living place to a work place during morning rush hours. The total travel cost include early and late arrival penalties as well as carriage body capacity. An equivalent mathematical programming model which generates equilibrium riding behavior is presented. The number of actually chosen transit runs, passenger flow distributions, and fares resulted from three system configurations namely social optimum, monopoly by one company and duopoly competition, are investigated by numerical examples.
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Huang, HJ., Tian, Q., Gao, ZY. (2005). An Equilibrium Model in Urban Transit Riding and Fare Polices. In: Megiddo, N., Xu, Y., Zhu, B. (eds) Algorithmic Applications in Management. AAIM 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3521. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11496199_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11496199_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-26224-4
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