Abstract
In this paper we study Classical Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (CIPD) dynamics of pure strategies in a discrete and determinist simulation context. We show that, in some very rare cases, they are not quiet and ordered. We propose a classification of ecological evolutions into categories which represent complex dynamics, such as oscillatory movements. We also show that those simulations are very sensitive to initial conditions. These experimentations could call into question classical conclusions about interest of cooperation between entities playing CIPD. They may be used to explain why it is not true that cooperation is always the convergent phenomenon observed in life.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Axelrod, R.: The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York (1984)
Beaufils, B., Delahaye, J.P., Mathieu, P.: Our Meeting with Gradual, A Good Strategy for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In: Langton, C.G., Shimohara, K. (eds.) Proceedings of the Fifth International Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems, Cambridge, MA, USA, pp. 202–209. The MIT Press/Bradford Books (1996); Artificial Life 5, Nara, Japan, May 16-18 (1996)
Beaufils, B., Delahaye, J.-P., Mathieu, P.: Complete classes of strategies for the classical iterated prisoner’s dilemma. In: Porto, V.W., Waagen, D. (eds.) EP 1998. LNCS, vol. 1447, pp. 33–41. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)
Delahaye, J.P., Mathieu, P.: Expriences sur le dilemme itr des prisonniers. Publication Interne IT-233, Laboratoire d’Informatique Fondamentale de Lille, Lille, France (1992)
Delahaye, J.P., Mathieu, P.: Complex Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In: Albert, A. (ed.) Chaos and Society. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, vol. 29, pp. 283–292 (1995); Universit du Qubec Hull, Canada, IOS Press/Presses de l’Universit du Qubec. Chaos & Society 1994, Trois Rivires, Canada, June 1-2 (1994)
Flood, M.M.: Some experimental games. Research memorandum RM-789-1- PR, RAND Corporation, Santa-Monica, CA, USA (June 1952)
Hofbauer, J., Sigmund, K.: Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1998)
Lindgren, K.: Evolutionary Phenomena in Simple Dynamics. In: Langton, C.G., Taylor, C., Doyne Farmer, J., Rasmussen, S. (eds.) Artificial Life II: Proceedings of the Second Interdisciplinary Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems. Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity, vol. 10, pp. 295–312. Addisson- Wesley Publishing Company, Reading (1992); Artificial Life 2, Santa Fe, USA (February 1990)
Nachbar, J.H.: Evolution in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 19, 307–326 (1992)
Nowak, M., Sigmund, K.: Oscillations in the Evolution of Reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical Biology 137, 21–26 (1989)
Poundstone, W.: Prisoner’s Dilemma: John von Neumann, Game Theory, and the Puzzle of the Bomb. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1993)
Maynard Smith, J.: The Games the Lizards Play. Nature 380, 198–199 (1996)
von Neumann, J., Morgenstern, O.: Theory of Games and Economics Behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1944)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Mathieu, P., Beaufils, B., Delahaye, JP. (2000). Studies on Dynamics in the Classical Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Few Strategies. In: Fonlupt, C., Hao, JK., Lutton, E., Schoenauer, M., Ronald, E. (eds) Artificial Evolution. AE 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1829. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/10721187_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/10721187_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-67846-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-44908-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive