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Hu Fu 0001
Person information
- affiliation: Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Institute for Theoretical Computer Science, Shanghai, China
- affiliation (2016 - 2020): University of British Columbia, Department of Computer Science, Vancouver, Canada
- affiliation: Microsoft Research, New England Lab, Cambridge, MA, USA
- affiliation (PhD): Cornell University, Department of Computer Science, Ithaca, NY, USA
Other persons with the same name
- Hu Fu — disambiguation page
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2020 – today
- 2024
- [c33]Taylor Lundy, Narun K. Raman, Hu Fu, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Pay to (Not) Play: Monetizing Impatience in Mobile Games. AAAI 2024: 9856-9864 - [c32]Yaoxin Ge, Yao Zhang, Dengji Zhao, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Hu Fu, Pinyan Lu:
Incentives for Early Arrival in Cooperative Games. AAMAS 2024: 651-659 - [i27]Hu Fu, Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Hongxun Wu, Jinzhao Wu, Qianfan Zhang:
Sample-Based Matroid Prophet Inequalities. CoRR abs/2406.12799 (2024) - 2023
- [c31]Yi Feng, Hu Fu, Qun Hu, Ping Li, Ioannis Panageas, Bo Peng, Xiao Wang:
On the Last-iterate Convergence in Time-varying Zero-sum Games: Extra Gradient Succeeds where Optimism Fails. NeurIPS 2023 - [c30]Hu Fu, Jiawei Li, Daogao Liu:
Pandora Box Problem with Nonobligatory Inspection: Hardness and Approximation Scheme. STOC 2023: 789-802 - [i26]Yi Feng, Hu Fu, Qun Hu, Ping Li, Ioannis Panageas, Bo Peng, Xiao Wang:
On the Last-iterate Convergence in Time-varying Zero-sum Games: Extra Gradient Succeeds where Optimism Fails. CoRR abs/2310.02604 (2023) - [i25]Taylor Lundy, Narun K. Raman, Hu Fu, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Pay to (Not) Play: Monetizing Impatience in Mobile Games. CoRR abs/2312.10205 (2023) - 2022
- [j13]John Z. F. Pang
, Weixuan Lin
Transparency and Control in Platforms for Networked Markets. Oper. Res. 70(3): 1665-1690 (2022) - [c29]Hu Fu, Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Abner Turkieltaub, Hongxun Wu, Jinzhao Wu, Qianfan Zhang:
Oblivious Online Contention Resolution Schemes. SOSA 2022: 268-278 - [c28]Hu Fu, Qun Hu, Jia'nan Lin:
Stability of Decentralized Queueing Networks Beyond Complete Bipartite Cases. WINE 2022: 96-114 - [e1]Michal Feldman
Web and Internet Economics - 17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14-17, 2021, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 13112, Springer 2022, ISBN 978-3-030-94675-3 [contents] - [i24]Hu Fu, Jiawei Li, Daogao Liu:
Pandora Box Problem with Nonobligatory Inspection: Hardness and Improved Approximation Algorithms. CoRR abs/2207.09545 (2022) - [i23]Hu Fu, Qun Hu, Jia'nan Lin:
Stability of Decentralized Queueing Networks Beyond Complete Bipartite Cases. CoRR abs/2210.07632 (2022) - 2021
- [j12]Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg
Full surplus extraction from samples. J. Econ. Theory 193: 105230 (2021) - [c27]Hu Fu, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Hongxun Wu, Jinzhao Wu, Qianfan Zhang:
Random Order Vertex Arrival Contention Resolution Schemes for Matching, with Applications. ICALP 2021: 68:1-68:20 - [i22]Hu Fu, Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Abner Turkieltaub, Hongxun Wu, Jinzhao Wu, Qianfan Zhang:
Oblivious Online Contention Resolution Schemes. CoRR abs/2111.10607 (2021) - 2020
- [j11]Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin
Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient. Games Econ. Behav. 123: 327-341 (2020) - [j10]Yang Cai
Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms. Proc. ACM Meas. Anal. Comput. Syst. 4(1): 12:1-12:31 (2020) - [j9]Hu Fu, Reshef Meir:
Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'19. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 8(4): 17:1 (2020) - [c26]Taylor Lundy, Hu Fu:
Limitations of Incentive Compatibility on Discrete Type Spaces. AAAI 2020: 2136-2143 - [c25]Hedayat Zarkoob, Hu Fu, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Report-Sensitive Spot-Checking in Peer-Grading Systems. AAMAS 2020: 1593-1601 - [c24]Hu Fu, Tao Lin:
Learning Utilities and Equilibria in Non-Truthful Auctions. NeurIPS 2020 - [c23]Amit Kadan
Exponential Convergence of Gradient Methods in Concave Network Zero-Sum Games. ECML/PKDD (2) 2020: 19-34 - [c22]Yang Cai
Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms. SIGMETRICS (Abstracts) 2020: 103 - [i21]Taylor Lundy, Hu Fu:
Limitations of Incentive Compatibility on Discrete Type Spaces. CoRR abs/2002.01046 (2020) - [i20]Hu Fu, Tao Lin:
Learning Utilities and Equilibria in Non-Truthful Auctions. CoRR abs/2007.01722 (2020) - [i19]Amit Kadan, Hu Fu:
Exponential Convergence of Gradient Methods in Concave Network Zero-sum Games. CoRR abs/2007.05477 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j8]Saeed Alaei
Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms. Math. Oper. Res. 44(3): 1058-1086 (2019) - [j7]Hu Fu, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Editors' introduction. SIGecom Exch. 17(2): 17 (2019) - [c21]Hedayat Zarkoob, Hu Fu, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Report-Sensitive Spot-checking in Peer Grading Systems. AAMAS 2019: 2306-2308 - [c20]Hu Fu, Christopher Liaw, Sikander Randhawa:
The Vickrey Auction with a Single Duplicate Bidder Approximates the Optimal Revenue. EC 2019: 419-420 - [c19]Taylor Lundy, Alexander Wei, Hu Fu, Scott Duke Kominers
Allocation for Social Good: Auditing Mechanisms for Utility Maximization. EC 2019: 785-803 - [i18]John Z. F. Pang, Weixuan Lin, Hu Fu, Jack Kleeman, Eilyan Bitar, Adam Wierman:
Transparency and Control in Platforms for Networked Markets. CoRR abs/1903.04574 (2019) - [i17]Hu Fu, Christopher Liaw, Sikander Randhawa:
The Vickrey Auction with a Single Duplicate Bidder Approximates the Optimal Revenue. CoRR abs/1905.03773 (2019) - [i16]Hedayat Zarkoob, Hu Fu, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Report-Sensitive Spot-Checking in Peer-Grading Systems. CoRR abs/1906.05884 (2019) - 2018
- [j6]Hu Fu:
Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exch. 16(2): 1 (2018) - [j5]Hu Fu, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Editors' introduction. SIGecom Exch. 17(1): 1 (2018) - [c18]Hu Fu, Christopher Liaw, Pinyan Lu
The Value of Information Concealment. SODA 2018: 2533-2544 - [i15]Yang Cai, Federico Echenique, Hu Fu, Katrina Ligett, Adam Wierman, Juba Ziani:
Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms. CoRR abs/1802.07407 (2018) - 2017
- [j4]Hu Fu:
Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exch. 15(2): 1 (2017) - [j3]Hu Fu:
Editor's introduction. SIGecom Exch. 16(1): 1 (2017) - [c17]John Z. F. Pang, Hu Fu, Won I. Lee, Adam Wierman:
The efficiency of open access in platforms for networked cournot markets. INFOCOM 2017: 1-9 - [i14]Hu Fu, Chris Liaw, Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
The Value of Information Concealment. CoRR abs/1707.05875 (2017) - 2015
- [j2]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg:
Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders. Games Econ. Behav. 92: 349-369 (2015) - [c16]Hu Fu, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Philipp Strack:
Randomization Beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction. EC 2015: 323 - [c15]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg:
On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions. SODA 2015: 110-122 - [i13]Hu Fu, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Philipp Strack:
Randomization beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction. CoRR abs/1507.08042 (2015) - 2014
- [c14]Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg:
Improved Lower Bounds for Testing Triangle-freeness in Boolean Functions via Fast Matrix Multiplication. APPROX-RANDOM 2014: 669-676 - [c13]Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg:
Optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling. EC 2014: 23-36 - [c12]Shuchi Chawla, Hu Fu, Anna R. Karlin:
Approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings. EC 2014: 277-294 - [i12]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg:
On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/1404.2041 (2014) - [i11]Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg:
Optimal Auctions for Correlated Buyers with Sampling. CoRR abs/1406.1571 (2014) - [i10]Shuchi Chawla, Hu Fu, Anna R. Karlin:
Approximate Revenue Maximization in Interdependent Value Settings. CoRR abs/1408.4424 (2014) - 2013
- [b1]Hu Fu:
Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanisms Design. Cornell University, USA, 2013 - [c11]Saeed Alaei
The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions. FOCS 2013: 628-637 - [c10]Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Cost-recovering bayesian algorithmic mechanism design. EC 2013: 453-470 - [c9]Hu Fu, Jason D. Hartline, Darrell Hoy:
Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents. EC 2013: 471-488 - [c8]Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient. STOC 2013: 201-210 - [i9]Hu Fu, Jason D. Hartline, Darrell Hoy:
Prior-independent Auctions for Risk-averse Agents. CoRR abs/1301.0401 (2013) - [i8]Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1305.0598 (2013) - [i7]Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg:
Improved Lower Bounds for Testing Triangle-freeness in Boolean Functions via Fast Matrix Multiplication. CoRR abs/1308.1643 (2013) - 2012
- [c7]Hu Fu, Patrick R. Jordan, Mohammad Mahdian, Uri Nadav, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
Ad auctions with data. INFOCOM Workshops 2012: 184-189 - [c6]Hu Fu, Patrick R. Jordan, Mohammad Mahdian, Uri Nadav, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
Ad Auctions with Data. SAGT 2012: 168-179 - [c5]Saeed Alaei
Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction. EC 2012: 17 - [c4]Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Ron Lavi
Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding. EC 2012: 586 - [c3]Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden:
Sketching valuation functions. SODA 2012: 1025-1035 - [i6]Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian:
Bayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction. CoRR abs/1203.5099 (2012) - [i5]Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian:
The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions. CoRR abs/1206.3541 (2012) - [i4]Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient. CoRR abs/1209.4703 (2012) - 2011
- [c2]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg:
Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy. STOC 2011: 129-138 - 2010
- [c1]David Buchfuhrer, Shaddin Dughmi, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Elchanan Mossel, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer, Christopher Umans:
Inapproximability for VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions. SODA 2010: 518-536 - [i3]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg:
Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy. CoRR abs/1011.2413 (2010) - [i2]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg:
Truthfulness via Proxies. CoRR abs/1011.3232 (2010)
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [i1]Shaddin Dughmi, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg:
Amplified Hardness of Approximation for VCG-Based Mechanisms. CoRR abs/0907.1948 (2009) - 2007
- [j1]Jin Gu
Identifications of conserved 7-mers in 3'-UTRs and microRNAs in Drosophila. BMC Bioinform. 8 (2007)
Coauthor Index
aka: Robert Kleinberg
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