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Yakov Babichenko
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2020 – today
- 2024
- [j26]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
A population's feasible posterior beliefs. J. Econ. Theory 215: 105764 (2024) - [c29]Yakov Babichenko
, Michal Feldman
Fair Division via Quantile Shares. STOC 2024: 1235-1246 - [i40]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Omer Madmon, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Robust Price Discrimination. CoRR abs/2401.16942 (2024) - [i39]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Dimitry Shaiderman, Xianwen Shi:
Persuading while Learning. CoRR abs/2407.13964 (2024) - 2023
- [c28]Itai Arieli
Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions. EC 2023: 118 - [c27]Itai Arieli
The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning. EC 2023: 119 - [i38]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Stephan Müller, Farzad Pourbabaee, Omer Tamuz:
The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning. CoRR abs/2301.11237 (2023) - [i37]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions. CoRR abs/2302.03667 (2023) - [i36]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy:
Persuasion as Transportation. CoRR abs/2307.07672 (2023) - [i35]Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi:
Algorithmic Cheap Talk. CoRR abs/2311.09011 (2023) - [i34]Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman, Vishnu V. Narayan:
Fair Division via Quantile Shares. CoRR abs/2312.01874 (2023) - 2022
- [j25]Yakov Babichenko
Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria. Games Econ. Behav. 134: 376-398 (2022) - [j24]Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu
Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion. Games Econ. Behav. 136: 226-248 (2022) - [j23]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank
Naive Learning Through Probability Overmatching. Oper. Res. 70(6): 3420-3431 (2022) - [c26]Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi:
Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion. ITCS 2022: 11:1-11:2 - [c25]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs. EC 2022: 326-327 - [c24]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy:
Persuasion as Transportation. EC 2022: 468 - [i33]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs. CoRR abs/2202.01846 (2022) - [i32]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy:
Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators. CoRR abs/2203.04285 (2022) - [i31]Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi
Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem. CoRR abs/2209.13688 (2022) - 2021
- [j22]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Segev Shlomov:
Virtually additive learning. J. Econ. Theory 197: 105322 (2021) - [j21]Yakov Babichenko
Learning Optimal Forecast Aggregation in Partial Evidence Environments. Math. Oper. Res. 46(2): 628-641 (2021) - [j20]Yakov Babichenko, Segev Shlomov
Robust learning in social networks via matrix scaling. Oper. Res. Lett. 49(5): 720-727 (2021) - [j19]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz:
Feasible joint posterior beliefs (through examples). SIGecom Exch. 19(1): 21-29 (2021) - [j18]Urban Larsson, Yakov Babichenko:
Golden games. Theor. Comput. Sci. 891: 50-58 (2021) - [c23]Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi:
Bayesian Persuasion under Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints. AAAI 2021: 5127-5134 - [c22]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank:
Sequential Naive Learning. EC 2021: 97 - [c21]Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi:
Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion. EC 2021: 128 - [c20]Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein:
Settling the complexity of Nash equilibrium in congestion games. STOC 2021: 1426-1437 - [i30]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank:
Sequential Naive Learning. CoRR abs/2101.02897 (2021) - [i29]Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi:
Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion. CoRR abs/2105.13870 (2021) - [i28]Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi:
Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion. CoRR abs/2111.09789 (2021) - 2020
- [j17]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky:
Identifiable information structures. Games Econ. Behav. 120: 16-27 (2020) - [c19]Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Incentive-Compatible Classification. AAAI 2020: 7055-7062 - [c18]Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein:
Communication complexity of Nash equilibrium in potential games (extended abstract). FOCS 2020: 1439-1445 - [c17]Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests. EC 2020: 111-131 - [c16]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky, Takuro Yamashita:
Optimal Persuasion via Bi-Pooling. EC 2020: 641 - [c15]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz:
Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs. EC 2020: 643 - [i27]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Omer Tamuz:
Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs. CoRR abs/2002.11362 (2020) - [i26]Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests. CoRR abs/2006.00600 (2020) - [i25]Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein:
Communication complexity of Nash equilibrium in potential games. CoRR abs/2011.06660 (2020) - [i24]Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Konstantin Zabarnyi:
Bayesian Persuasion under Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints. CoRR abs/2012.03272 (2020) - [i23]Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein:
Settling the complexity of Nash equilibrium in congestion games. CoRR abs/2012.04327 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j16]Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky:
Stable Secretaries. Algorithmica 81(8): 3136-3161 (2019) - [j15]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
Private Bayesian persuasion. J. Econ. Theory 182: 185-217 (2019) - [j14]Yakov Babichenko:
Informational bounds on equilibria (a survey). SIGecom Exch. 17(2): 25-45 (2019) - [c14]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Segev Shlomov:
Robust Non-Bayesian Social Learning. EC 2019: 549-550 - [c13]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank:
Naive Learning Through Probability Matching. EC 2019: 553 - [c12]Yakov Babichenko, Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
The communication complexity of local search. STOC 2019: 650-661 - [c11]Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Sequential Voting with Confirmation Network. TARK 2019: 19-34 - [i22]Urban Larsson, Yakov Babichenko:
Golden games. CoRR abs/1909.04231 (2019) - [i21]Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Incentive-Compatible Classification. CoRR abs/1911.08849 (2019) - 2018
- [j13]Yakov Babichenko
Fast Convergence of Best-Reply Dynamics in Aggregative Games. Math. Oper. Res. 43(1): 333-346 (2018) - [c10]Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Incentive-Compatible Diffusion. WWW 2018: 1379-1388 - [i20]Yakov Babichenko, Dan Garber:
Learning of Optimal Forecast Aggregation in Partial Evidence Environments. CoRR abs/1802.07107 (2018) - [i19]Yakov Babichenko, Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
The Communication Complexity of Local Search. CoRR abs/1804.02676 (2018) - [i18]Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Incentive-Compatible Diffusion. CoRR abs/1805.08013 (2018) - [i17]Oren Dean, Yakov Babichenko, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Paradoxes in Sequential Voting. CoRR abs/1807.03979 (2018) - 2017
- [j12]Itai Arieli
Sequential commitment games. Games Econ. Behav. 105: 297-315 (2017) - [j11]Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman, Ron Peretz:
Empirical Distribution of Equilibrium Play and Its Testing Application. Math. Oper. Res. 42(1): 15-29 (2017) - [c9]Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman:
Algorithmic Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion. ITCS 2017: 34:1-34:16 - [c8]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky:
Forecast Aggregation. EC 2017: 61-62 - [c7]Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky:
Stable Secretaries. EC 2017: 243-244 - [c6]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
Simple Approximate Equilibria in Games with Many Players. EC 2017: 681-691 - [c5]Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein:
Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria. STOC 2017: 878-889 - [i16]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
Simple approximate equilibria in games with many players. CoRR abs/1701.07956 (2017) - [i15]Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky:
Stable Secretaries. CoRR abs/1705.01589 (2017) - 2016
- [j10]Yakov Babichenko:
Query Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria. J. ACM 63(4): 36:1-36:24 (2016) - [j9]Yakov Babichenko, Omer Tamuz
Graphical potential games. J. Econ. Theory 163: 889-899 (2016) - [j8]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
Random extensive form games. J. Econ. Theory 166: 517-535 (2016) - [c4]Yakov Babichenko, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Aviad Rubinstein:
Can Almost Everybody be Almost Happy? ITCS 2016: 1-9 - [i14]Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman:
Computational Aspects of Private Bayesian Persuasion. CoRR abs/1603.01444 (2016) - [i13]Yakov Babichenko, Aviad Rubinstein:
Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria. CoRR abs/1608.06580 (2016) - 2015
- [j7]Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman:
Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 3(4): 22:1-22:9 (2015) - [i12]Yakov Babichenko, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Aviad Rubinstein:
Can Almost Everybody be Almost Happy? PCP for PPAD and the Inapproximability of Nash. CoRR abs/1504.02411 (2015) - [i11]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
Random Extensive Form Games and its Application to Bargaining. CoRR abs/1509.02337 (2015) - 2014
- [j6]Yakov Babichenko:
How long to Pareto efficiency? Int. J. Game Theory 43(1): 13-24 (2014) - [j5]Yehuda Afek, Yakov Babichenko, Uriel Feige, Eli Gafni, Nati Linial, Benny Sudakov:
Musical Chairs. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 28(3): 1578-1600 (2014) - [c3]Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman, Ron Peretz:
Simple approximate equilibria in large games. EC 2014: 753-770 - [c2]Yakov Babichenko:
Query complexity of approximate nash equilibria. STOC 2014: 535-544 - [i10]Yakov Babichenko:
Axiomatic Approach to Solutions of Games. CoRR abs/1402.5165 (2014) - [i9]Yakov Babichenko, Omer Tamuz:
Graphical potential games. CoRR abs/1405.1481 (2014) - 2013
- [j4]Yakov Babichenko:
Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games. Games Econ. Behav. 81: 130-144 (2013) - [i8]Yakov Babichenko:
Small Support Equilibria in Large Games. CoRR abs/1305.2432 (2013) - [i7]Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman:
Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium. CoRR abs/1306.2437 (2013) - [i6]Yakov Babichenko:
Query Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibria. CoRR abs/1306.6686 (2013) - [i5]Yakov Babichenko, Ron Peretz:
Approximate Nash Equilibria via Sampling. CoRR abs/1307.4934 (2013) - [i4]Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman, Ron Peretz:
Small-Support Approximate Correlated Equilibria. CoRR abs/1308.6025 (2013) - [i3]Yakov Babichenko, Siddharth Barman, Ron Peretz:
Empirical Distribution of Equilibrium Play and Its Testing Application. CoRR abs/1310.7654 (2013) - 2012
- [j3]Yakov Babichenko:
Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria. Games Econ. Behav. 76(1): 1-14 (2012) - [j2]Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
Average testing and Pareto efficiency. J. Econ. Theory 147(6): 2376-2398 (2012) - [i2]Yehuda Afek, Yakov Babichenko, Uriel Feige, Eli Gafni, Nati Linial, Benny Sudakov:
Musical chairs. CoRR abs/1208.0813 (2012) - 2011
- [c1]Yehuda Afek, Yakov Babichenko, Uriel Feige, Eli Gafni, Nati Linial, Benny Sudakov:
Oblivious Collaboration. DISC 2011: 489-504 - [i1]Yehuda Afek, Yakov Babichenko, Uriel Feige, Eli Gafni, Nati Linial, Benny Sudakov:
Oblivious Collaboration. CoRR abs/1106.2065 (2011) - 2010
- [j1]Yakov Babichenko:
Uncoupled automata and pure Nash equilibria. Int. J. Game Theory 39(3): 483-502 (2010)
Coauthor Index
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