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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 113
Volume 113, January 2019
- Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden:
Introduction to the Special Issue - Algorithmic Game Theory - STOC/FOCS/SODA 2012. 1-3 - Berthold Vöcking:
A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions. 4-16 - Konstantinos Georgiou, Chaitanya Swamy:
Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design. 17-37 - Amos Fiat, Elias Koutsoupias, Katrina Ligett
, Yishay Mansour, Svetlana Olonetsky:
Beyond myopic best response (in Cournot competition). 38-57 - Sanjeev Goyal, Hoda Heidari, Michael J. Kearns:
Competitive contagion in networks. 58-79 - Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Optimal crowdsourcing contests. 80-96 - Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
:
Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design. 97-115
- Francesc Dilmé:
Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions. 116-136 - Giovanni Di Bartolomeo
, Martin Dufwenberg, Stefano Papa, Francesco Passarelli:
Promises, expectations & causation. 137-146 - Flip Klijn
, Joana Pais
, Marc Vorsatz
:
Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment. 147-163 - Nicolas S. Lambert, Adrian Marple
, Yoav Shoham:
On equilibria in games with imperfect recall. 164-185 - Ari Stern, Alexander Tettenhorst:
Hodge decomposition and the Shapley value of a cooperative game. 186-198 - Bertan Turhan
:
Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets. 199-208 - Indranil Chakraborty:
Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders. 209-222 - Yuval Heller
, Erik Mohlin
:
Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli. 223-247 - F. Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz
, Carles Rafels, Neus Ybern:
Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions. 248-261 - Joan de Martí, Pau Milán
:
Regime change in large information networks. 262-284 - Matías Núñez, Marcus Pivato
:
Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations. 285-305 - Shintaro Miura:
Manipulated news model: Electoral competition and mass media. 306-338 - Igal Milchtaich
:
Polyequilibrium. 339-355 - Andreas Blume, Ernest K. Lai
, Wooyoung Lim
:
Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response. 356-380 - Daniel Stephenson
:
Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: When are evolutionary models reliable? 381-395 - Siqi Pan
:
The instability of matching with overconfident agents. 396-415 - David Lagziel
:
Credit auctions and bid caps. 416-422 - Yves Breitmoser:
Knowing me, imagining you: Projection and overbidding in auctions. 423-447 - Dietmar Fehr, Matthias Sutter
:
Gossip and the efficiency of interactions. 448-460 - Rebecca B. Morton
, Marco Piovesan
, Jean-Robert Tyran
:
The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting. 461-481 - Klaus Abbink, Gönül Dogan:
How to choose your victim. 482-496 - Paolo Roberti
:
Citizens or lobbies: Who controls policy? 497-514 - Min-Hung Tsay, Chun-Hsien Yeh:
Relations among the central rules in bankruptcy problems: A strategic perspective. 515-532 - Itay P. Fainmesser:
Exclusive intermediation in unobservable networks. 533-548 - Alexander Coutts
:
Testing models of belief bias: An experiment. 549-565 - Luca Polonio
, Giorgio Coricelli:
Testing the level of consistency between choices and beliefs in games using eye-tracking. 566-586 - Nobuyuki Hanaki
, Yukio Koriyama
, Angela Sutan
, Marc Willinger:
The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games. 587-610 - Gagan Ghosh, Heng Liu:
Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets. 611-632 - Ryoji Sawa
:
Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems. 633-650 - Michael Kurschilgen
, Isabel Marcin:
Communication is more than information sharing: The role of status-relevant knowledge. 651-672 - Swaprava Nath
, Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains. 673-693 - Shuo Liu
:
Voting with public information. 694-719 - Juan Ortner:
A continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining. 720-733
- Henk Norde
:
The degree and cost adjusted folk solution for minimum cost spanning tree games. 734-742 - Pierre Chaigneau
, Alex Edmans
, Daniel Gottlieb
:
The informativeness principle without the first-order approach. 743-755 - Luke Boosey
, Philip Brookins, Dmitry Ryvkin
:
Contests between groups of unknown size. 756-769 - Lianjie Jiang, Jiabin Wu
:
Belief-updating rule and sequential reciprocity. 770-780
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