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International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 44
Volume 44, Number 1, February 2015
- Francesc Llerena
, Marina Núñez
An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets. 1-15 - Shota Fujishima:
The emergence of cooperation through leadership. 17-36 - Aviad Heifetz, Andrés Perea:
On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability. 37-59 - Matthias Blonski, Giancarlo Spagnolo
Prisoners' other Dilemma. 61-81 - Lukasz Balbus
Time consistent Markov policies in dynamic economies with quasi-hyperbolic consumers. 83-112 - Ido Erev
On loss aversion, level-1 reasoning, and betting. 113-133 - Avishay Aiche, Anna Rubinchik
The asymptotic core, nucleolus and Shapley value of smooth market games with symmetric large players. 135-151 - Yossi Feinberg, Nicolas S. Lambert:
Mostly calibrated. 153-163 - Dieter Balkenborg, Josef Hofbauer, Christoph Kuzmics
The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games. 165-193 - Miki Kato, Shinji Ohseto
Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money. 195-207 - Francis Flanagan:
Contracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching. 209-223 - Nikolai S. Kukushkin
The single crossing conditions for incomplete preferences. 225-251
Volume 44, Number 2, May 2015
- Gagan Ghosh:
Non-existence of equilibria in simultaneous auctions with a common budget-constraint. 253-274 - Koji Yokote:
Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value. 275-293 - Ali Hameed, Arkadii Slinko
Roughly weighted hierarchical simple games. 295-319 - Cy Maor, Eilon Solan
Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors. 321-346 - Vic Baston, Kensaku Kikuta:
Search games on a network with travelling and search costs. 347-365 - Isa Emin Hafalir, Hadi Yektas:
Core deviation minimizing auctions. 367-376 - Omer Edhan
The conic property for vector measure market games. 377-386 - Qiang Fu, Qian Jiao, Jingfeng Lu:
Contests with endogenous entry. 387-424 - Marek Hudík
A preference change or a perception change? A comment on Dietrich and List. 425-431 - Boyu Zhang, Josef Hofbauer:
Equilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in \(2 \times 2\) coordination games. 433-448 - René van den Brink
On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games. 449-471 - James S. Jordan, David Obadia:
Stable sets in majority pillage games. 473-486 - Sergei Pechersky:
A note on external angles of the core of convex TU games, marginal worth vectors and the Weber set. 487-498 - Katsuhiko Aiba:
Waiting times in evolutionary dynamics with time-decreasing noise. 499-514
Volume 44, Number 3, August 2015
- Igal Milchtaich
Network topology and equilibrium existence in weighted network congestion games. 515-541 - M. Bumin Yenmez
Incentive compatible market design with applications. 543-569 - Dan Kovenock, Sudipta Sarangi, Matt Wiser:
All-pay 2×2 Hex: a multibattle contest with complementarities. 571-597 - Sjaak Hurkens
Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines. 599-629 - Javier Hervés-Estévez, Emma Moreno-García
On restricted bargaining sets. 631-645 - Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer:
Strong equilibrium in network congestion games: increasing versus decreasing costs. 647-666 - Georgios C. Chasparis
Nonconvergence to saddle boundary points under perturbed reinforcement learning. 667-699 - Sergio Currarini
Information sharing networks in linear quadratic games. 701-732 - Stéphane Gonzalez
Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games. 733-760 - Stefan Steinerberger
On the number of positions in chess without promotion. 761-767 - A. J. J. Talman, Zaifu Yang
An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders. 769-784
Volume 44, Number 4, November 2015
- Federico Quartieri, Ryusuke Shinohara
Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes. 785-813 - Arnold Polanski
Dynamic multilateral markets. 815-833 - Gustavo Bergantiños
Characterization of monotonic rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems. 835-868 - Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, Richard P. McLean:
On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games. 869-890 - Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal:
Axioms of invariance for TU-games. 891-902 - Heinrich H. Nax, Bary S. R. Pradelski:
Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games. 903-932 - Seok-ju Cho
A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model. 933-948 - Kalyan Chatterjee, Kaustav Das:
Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the "law of one price". 949-991 - Simon Mackenzie, Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat:
Pillage games with multiple stable sets. 993-1013 - Virginie Masson:
Information, interaction and memory. 1015-1032 - Tadashi Sekiguchi:
Multimarket contact under demand fluctuations. 1033-1048 - Artyom Jelnov, Yair Tauman:
Erratum to: Voting power and proportional representation of voters. 1049
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