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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 80
Volume 80, July 2013
- Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal:
An optimal bound to access the core in TU-games. 1-9 - Ratul Lahkar, Robert M. Seymour:
Reinforcement learning in population games. 10-38 - Gabriel E. Kreindler, H. Peyton Young:
Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection. 39-67 - Topi Miettinen:
Promises and conventions - An approach to pre-play agreements. 68-84 - Özgür Kibris, Arzu Kibris:
On the investment implications of bankruptcy laws. 85-99 - Juan Sebastián Pereyra:
A dynamic school choice model. 100-114 - Jeffrey P. Carpenter, Michael Graham, Jesse Wolf:
Cognitive ability and strategic sophistication. 115-130 - Helios Herrera, Johannes Hörner:
Biased social learning. 131-146 - Yi-Chun Chen, Siyang Xiong:
The e-mail game phenomenon. 147-156 - Susanne Goldlücke, Sebastian Kranz:
Renegotiation-proof relational contracts. 157-178
- Yuichiro Kamada, Fuhito Kojima:
The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models. 179-185 - Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass:
Conservative belief and rationality. 186-192
- José Alcalde, Matthias Dahm:
Competition for procurement shares. 193-208
- Alexey Kushnir:
Harmful signaling in matching markets. 209-218
- Peter Sudhölter, José Manuel Zarzuelo:
Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points. 219-228 - Gergely Csapó, Rudolf Müller:
Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good. 229-242 - Francis Bloch, Nicolas Quérou:
Pricing in social networks. 243-261
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