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The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model. (2010). Oviedo, Jorge ; Neme, Alejandro ; Masso, Jordi ; Martinez, Ruth .
In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:5:p:937-949.

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Cited: 6

Citations received by this document

Cites: 19

References cited by this document

Cocites: 29

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Coauthors: 0

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Citations received by this document

  1. Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: A topological approach. (2020). , James ; James, .
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:91:y:2020:i:c:p:136-140.

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  2. On the number of employed in the matching model. (2019). Okumura, Yasunori ; Kitahara, Minoru.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:83:y:2019:i:c:p:63-69.

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  3. Fair student placement. (2017). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: Theory and Decision.
    RePEc:kap:theord:v:83:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-017-9598-8.

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  4. The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings. (2017). Tian, Guoqiang ; Jiao, Zhenhua.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:102:y:2017:i:c:p:44-55.

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  5. The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts. (2016). Tian, Guoqiang ; Jiao, Zhenhua ; Yang, Fei ; Chen, Songqing .
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:82:y:2016:i:c:p:65-71.

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  6. Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts. (2009). Kojima, Fuhito ; Hatfield, John William .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:745-749.

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References

References cited by this document

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  9. Gale, D. ; Sotomayor, M. Some remarks on the stable matching problem. 1985 Discrete Applied Mathematics. 11 223-232
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  10. Kelso, A. ; Crawford, V. Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes. 1982 Econometrica. 50 1483-1504

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  13. Martínez, R. ; Massó, J. ; Neme, A. ; Oviedo, J. Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings. 2000 Journal of Economic Theory. 91 91-105

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  15. Roth, A. Stability and polarization of interests in job matching. 1984 Econometrica. 52 47-57

  16. Roth, A. The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem. 1985 Journal of Economic Theory. 36 277-288

  17. Roth, A. ; Sotomayor, M. Two-sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. 1990 Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, England
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  18. Roth, A. ; Xing, X. Jumping the gun: imperfections and institutions related to the timing of market transactions. 1994 American Economic Review. 84 992-1044

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  4. Accommodating various policy goals in matching with constraints. (2020). Kojima, Fuhito ; Kamada, Yuichiro.
    In: The Japanese Economic Review.
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  8. Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets. (2018). Kadam, Sangram V ; Kotowski, Maciej H.
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  9. On lexicographic choice. (2018). Chambers, Christopher ; Yenmez, Bumin M.
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  10. The Blocking Lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings. (2017). Tian, Guoqiang ; Jiao, Zhenhua.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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  11. The blocking lemma and group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts. (2016). Tian, Guoqiang ; Jiao, Zhenhua ; Yang, Fei ; Chen, Songqing .
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:82:y:2016:i:c:p:65-71.

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  12. On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets. (2014). Klijn, Flip ; Kayi, Cagatay ; Jaramillo, Paula.
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  13. A many-to-many ‘rural hospital theorem’. (2014). Klijn, Flip ; Yazc, Aye .
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  14. Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules. (2012). watabe, masahiro ; Kumano, Taro .
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  15. On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets. (2012). Klijn, Flip ; Kayi, Cagatay ; Jaramillo, Paula.
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  16. On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets. (2012). Klijn, Flip ; Jaramillo, Paula ; Kay, Cagatay .
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  17. On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets. (2012). Klijn, Flip ; Kayi, Cagatay ; Jaramillo, Paula.
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  18. Agreement toward stability in matching markets. (2011). Cantala, David.
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  20. The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model. (2010). Oviedo, Jorge ; Neme, Alejandro ; Masso, Jordi ; Martinez, Ruth .
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
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  21. Agreement toward stability in senior matching markets. (2007). cantala, david.
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  22. Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems. (2007). Ehlers, Lars.
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  23. A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets. (2005). Oviedo, Jorge ; Echenique, Federico.
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  24. A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets. (2004). Oviedo, Jorge ; Echenique, Federico.
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  25. An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings. (2004). Oviedo, Jorge ; Neme, Alejandro ; Masso, Jordi ; Martinez, Ruth .
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  26. Restabilizing matching markets at senior level. (2004). cantala, david.
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  27. The presence of lattice theory in discrete problems of mathematical social sciences. Why. (2003). Monjardet, Bernard.
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