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The Optimality of Being Efficient. (1999). Cramton, Peter ; Ausubel, Lawrence M..
In: Papers of Peter Cramton.
RePEc:pcc:pccumd:98wpoe.

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Cited: 39

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Cites: 33

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Cocites: 50

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  1. Is small always beautiful? Analyzing the efficiency effects of size heterogeneity in renewable electricity auctions. (2022). del Rio, Pablo ; Alvarez, Francisco.
    In: Energy Economics.
    RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:106:y:2022:i:c:s0140988321005508.

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  2. Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences. (2020). Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Mishra, Debasis ; Kazumura, Tomoya.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0022053118305866.

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  3. Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences. (2020). Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Mishra, Debasis ; Kazumura, Tomoya.
    In: ISER Discussion Paper.
    RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1001r.

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  4. Multi-object auctions with resale: Theory and experiment. (2015). Ozbay, Erkut ; Lopez Vargas, Kristian ; Filiz Ozbay, Emel ; Filiz-Ozbay, Emel ; Lopez-Vargas, Kristian .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:89:y:2015:i:c:p:1-16.

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  5. Optimal combinatorial mechanism design. (2013). Ülkü, Levent ; ulku, Levent .
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:53:y:2013:i:2:p:473-498.

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  6. Auction Design for a Strategic Reserve Market for Generation Adequacy: On the Incentives Under Different Auction Scoring Rules. (2013). Brunekreeft, Gert ; Rammerstorfer, Margarethe ; Meyer, Roland.
    In: Bremen Energy Working Papers.
    RePEc:bei:00bewp:0014.

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  7. System and Method for an Auction of Multiple Types of Items. (2012). Cramton, Peter ; Ausubel, Lawrence M. ; Jones, Wynne P..
    In: Papers of Peter Cramton.
    RePEc:pcc:pccumd:11acjam.

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  8. System and Method for a Hybrid Clock and Proxy Auction. (2012). Milgrom, Paul ; Cramton, Peter ; Ausubel, Lawrence M..
    In: Papers of Peter Cramton.
    RePEc:pcc:pccumd:10acmhc.

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  9. English auctions with resale: An experimental study. (2011). Georganas, Sotiris.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:1:p:147-166.

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  10. How to sell a (bankrupt) company?. (2010). Felli, Leonardo ; Cornelli, Francesca.
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:4685.

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  11. A Coase Theorem Based on a New Concept of the Core. (2009). Zheng, Charles.
    In: Staff General Research Papers Archive.
    RePEc:isu:genres:13051.

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  12. Matrix Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions. (2009). Day, Robert W ; Raghavan, S.
    In: Operations Research.
    RePEc:inm:oropre:v:57:y:2009:i:4:p:916-933.

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  13. The chopstick auction: A study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions. (2009). Sausgruber, Rupert ; Guillen, Pablo ; Onderstal, Sander ; Englmaier, Florian ; Llorente, Loreto .
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:27:y:2009:i:2:p:286-291.

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  14. First-Price, Second-Price, and English Auctions with Resale. (2008). Lebrun, Bernard.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:yca:wpaper:2008_06.

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  15. Should Speculators Be Welcomed in Auctions?. (2007). Pagnozzi, Marco.
    In: CSEF Working Papers.
    RePEc:sef:csefwp:176.

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  16. All-pay auctions with resale. (2007). Sui, Yong.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:11463.

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  17. Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions. (2007). Day, Robert W. ; Raghavan, S..
    In: Management Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:53:y:2007:i:9:p:1389-1406.

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  18. Bidding to Lose? Auctions with Resale. (2006). Pagnozzi, Marco.
    In: CSEF Working Papers.
    RePEc:sef:csefwp:116.

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  19. Optimal Mechanisms with Finite Agent Types. (2006). Lovejoy, William S..
    In: Management Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:52:y:2006:i:5:p:788-803.

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  20. Buy-price English auction. (2006). Whinston, Andrew B. ; Hidvegi, Zoltan ; Wang, Wen Li .
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:129:y:2006:i:1:p:31-56.

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  21. The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions. (2006). Sausgruber, Rupert ; Guillen, Pablo ; Onderstal, Sander ; Englmaier, Florian ; Llorente, Loreto .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1782.

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  22. Optimal second-degree price discrimination and arbitrage: On the role of asymetric information among buyers. (2005). Menicucci, Domenico ; Jeon, Doh-Shin.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:upf:upfgen:624.

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  23. A Smart Market for Industrial Procurement with Capacity Constraints. (2005). Gallien, Jeremie ; Wein, Lawrence M..
    In: Management Science.
    RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:51:y:2005:i:1:p:76-91.

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  24. Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale. (2004). Garratt, Rodney ; Troger, Thomas.
    In: Microeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0405005.

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  25. The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction. (2004). Milgrom, Paul ; Ausubel, Lawrence M..
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:sip:dpaper:03-036.

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  26. Monopoly with Resale. (2004). Pavan, Alessandro ; Calzolari, Giacomo.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1393.

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  27. The relationship between the allocation of goods and a sellers revenue. (2004). Jackson, Matthew ; Kremer, Ilan.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:40:y:2004:i:3-4:p:371-392.

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  28. Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities. (2004). Lopomo, Giuseppe (Pino) ; Brusco, Sandro.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000385.

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  29. Design and analysis of a smart market for industrial procurement. (2003). Gallien, Jeremie., ; Wein, Lawrence M..
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:mit:sloanp:2780.

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  30. Auctions for Procuring Options. (2003). Schummer, James ; Vohra, Rakesh V.
    In: Operations Research.
    RePEc:inm:oropre:v:51:y:2003:i:1:p:41-51.

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  31. Monopoly with Resale. (2003). Pavan, Alessandro ; Calzolari, Giacomo.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.20.

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  32. Yardstick Based Procurement Design In Natural Resource Management. (2003). Nielsen, Kurt ; Bogetoft, Peter.
    In: 2003 Annual Meeting, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, South Africa.
    RePEc:ags:iaae03:25910.

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  33. Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to Auction Not Grandfather. (2002). Kerr, Suzi ; Cramton, Peter.
    In: Papers of Peter Cramton.
    RePEc:pcc:pccumd:02eptc.

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  34. Spectrum Auctions. (2001). Cramton, Peter.
    In: Papers of Peter Cramton.
    RePEc:pcc:pccumd:01hte.

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  35. A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions. (2001). Moldovanu, Benny ; Jehiel, Philippe.
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01c70004.

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  36. How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company?. (2001). Felli, Leonardo ; Cornelli, Francesca.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2881.

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  37. An Optimal Auction When Resale Cannot Be Prohibited. (2000). Zheng, Charles.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1303.

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  38. Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing. (1999). Cramton, Peter ; Ausubel, Lawrence M..
    In: Papers of Peter Cramton.
    RePEc:pcc:pccumd:99wpvic.

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  39. Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions. (1999). Cramton, Peter ; Schwartz, Jesse .
    In: Papers of Peter Cramton.
    RePEc:pcc:pccumd:00jre.

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References

References cited by this document

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Cocites

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  1. Bundling decisions in procurement auctions with sequential tasks. (2015). Li, Sanxi ; Yu, Jun ; JunYu, ; Yan, Jianye ; Sun, Hailin.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:128:y:2015:i:c:p:96-106.

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  2. On the optimality of pure bundling for a monopolist. (2015). Menicucci, Domenico ; Jeon, Doh-Shin ; Hurkens, Sjaak.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:60:y:2015:i:c:p:33-42.

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  3. Complements and Substitutes in Sequential Auctions: The Case of Water Auctions. (2014). Donna, Javier ; Espin-Sanchez, Jose .
    In: MPRA Paper.
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  4. Revenue and efficiency ranking in large multi-unit and bundle auctions. (2014). Chakraborty, Indranil ; Shyamalkumar, Nariankadu D..
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
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  5. Generalized reduced-form auctions: a network-flow approach. (2013). Kim, Jinwoo ; Che, Yeon-Koo ; Mierendorff, Konrad.
    In: ECON - Working Papers.
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  6. Combination bidding in multi-unit auctions. (2013). Pesendorfer, Martin ; Cantillon, Estelle.
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:54289.

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  7. Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design. (2012). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
    In: CIRJE F-Series.
    RePEc:tky:fseres:2012cf853.

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  8. Optimal Multiunit Exchange Design. (2012). Matsushima, Hitoshi.
    In: CARF F-Series.
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  9. Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information. (2011). Skreta, Vasiliki ; Figueroa, Nicolas.
    In: Review of Economic Design.
    RePEc:spr:reecde:v:15:y:2011:i:3:p:213-243.

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  10. Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry. (2010). Miralles, Antonio.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:42:y:2010:i:3:p:523-538.

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  11. Auctioning greenhouse gas emissions permits in Australia. (2010). Kerr, Suzi ; Cramton, Peter ; Betz, Regina ; Seifert, Stefan.
    In: Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    RePEc:ags:aareaj:162006.

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  12. An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective. (2009). Vohra, Rakesh ; Malakhov, Alexey.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:39:y:2009:i:1:p:113-128.

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  13. Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect. (2009). Board, Simon.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:38:y:2009:i:1:p:125-135.

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  14. Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment. (2009). Ostrovsky, Michael ; Schwarz, Michael.
    In: Research Papers.
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  15. Optimal Mechanisms for Single Machine Scheduling. (2008). Müller, Rudolf ; Mishra, Debasis ; Heydenreich, Birgit ; Muller, Rudolf ; Uetz, Marc .
    In: Research Memorandum.
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  16. The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design. (2008). Skreta, Vasiliki ; Figueroa, Nicolas.
    In: Working Papers.
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  17. Optimal Multi-Object Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers. (2008). Yektas, Hadi ; Kumru, Cagri.
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  18. Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation. (2007). Armstrong, Mark ; Sappington, David E. M., ; Sappington, DavidE. M., .
    In: Handbook of Industrial Organization.
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  19. The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design. (2007). Skreta, Vasiliki ; Figueroa, Nicolas.
    In: Documentos de Trabajo.
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  20. Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions. (2007). Pesendorfer, Martin ; Cantillon, Estelle.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6083.

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  21. Procurement when Price and Quality Matter. (2007). Cantillon, Estelle ; Asker, John.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6082.

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  22. Mixed Bundling Auctions. (2006). Moldovanu, Benny ; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz ; Jehiel, Philippe.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
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  23. Endogenous entry and auctions design with private participation costs. (2006). Lu, Jingfeng.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:934.

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  24. Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement. (2006). Grimm, Veronika.
    In: Working Paper Series in Economics.
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  25. Optimal sequential auctions. (2006). Pesendorfer, Martin ; Jofre-Bonet, Mireia.
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
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  26. Efficient procurement with quality concerns. (2006). Morand, Pierre-Henri ; Thomas, Lionel.
    In: Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain).
    RePEc:ctl:louvre:2006022.

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  27. Mixed Bundling Auctions. (2006). Moldovanu, Benny ; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz ; Jehiel, Philippe ; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz, .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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  28. The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design. (2006). Skreta, Vasiliki ; Figueroa, Nicolas.
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  29. Mixed Bundling Auctions. (2006). Moldovanu, Benny ; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz ; Jehiel, Philippe.
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  30. Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms. (2005). Moldovanu, Benny ; Jehiel, Philippe.
    In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
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  31. Optimal Procurement When Both Price and Quality Matter. (2005). Cantillon, Estelle ; Asker, John.
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  32. Optimal Auction Design for Multiple Objects with Externalities. (2005). Skreta, Vasiliki.
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  33. Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms. (2005). Moldovanu, Benny ; Jehiel, Philippe.
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  34. Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition. (2005). Miralles, Antonio.
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  35. Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts. (2004). Nilsson, Jan-Eric ; Lunander, Anders.
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  36. ON PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS OF COMPLEMENTARY GOODS. (2004). Grimm, Veronika.
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  37. Optimal Allocation Mechanisms When Bidders Ranking for the objects is common. (2004). Feng, Juan.
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  38. Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities. (2004). Lopomo, Giuseppe (Pino) ; Brusco, Sandro.
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  39. Revenue Implications of Multi-Item Multi-Unit Auction Designs: Empirical Evidence from the U.S. Treasury Buyback Auctions. (2004). han, bing ; Longstaff, Francis A ; Merrill, Craig.
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  41. postbid market interaction and auction choice. (2002). Zhong, Hongjun.
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  42. Combination Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions. (2002). Cantillon, Estelle .
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  43. Optimal two-object auctions with synergies.. (2001). Menicucci, Domenico.
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  44. A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions. (2001). Moldovanu, Benny ; Jehiel, Philippe.
    In: Economics Bulletin.
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  45. Screening Through Bundling. (2001). Miravete, Eugenio.
    In: Penn CARESS Working Papers.
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