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Bargaining and the Nature of War. (2004). Stam, Allan.
In: Journal of Conflict Resolution.
RePEc:sae:jocore:v:48:y:2004:i:6:p:783-813.

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  2. Analyzing strategic behavior in a dynamic model of bargaining and war. (2023). Sağlam, Çağrı ; Doan, Serhat ; Salam, Ari ; Keskin, Kerim.
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  3. Denial and punishment in war. (2022). Nakao, Keisuke.
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  4. Democratic Victory and War Duration: Why Are Democracies Less Likely to Win Long Wars?. (2022). Nakao, Keisuke.
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  5. Symbolic victories and strategic risk. (2021). Jordan, Richard.
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  6. Biding time versus timely retreat: Asymmetric dependence, issue salience, and conflict duration. (2021). Zeng, Yuleng.
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  7. Impeding fatal violence through third-party diplomacy: The effect of mediation on conflict intensity. (2021). Ruhe, Constantin.
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  8. Interstate War Battle dataset (1823–2003). (2021). Min, Eric.
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  9. Overconfidence and conflict. (2021). Sekeris, Petros ; Menuet, Maxime.
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  10. Predicting the costs of war. (2020). Henrickson, Phil.
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  11. Aiding refugees, aiding peace?. (2020). Lehmann, Christian M.
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  13. Moving Forward vs. Inflicting Costs in a Random-Walk Model of War. (2019). Nakao, Keisuke.
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  16. The impact of criminal prosecutions during intrastate conflict. (2018). .
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  17. Policy bargaining and militarized conflict. (2017). .
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  18. More dangerous than dyads: how a third party enables rationalist explanations for war. (2017). .
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  19. Denial vs. Punishment: Strategies Shape War, but War Itself Affects Strategies. (2017). Nakao, Keisuke.
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  20. On the Dynamics of Extremist Violence. (2016). Kıbrıs, Özgür ; Arzu, Kibris ; Ozgur, Kibris .
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  24. Air Campaign Duration and the Interaction of Air and Ground Forces. (2015). MacHain, Carla Martinez.
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  25. Strategic ambiguity about military capacity with multiple adversaries. (2015). .
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  26. Conflict bargaining as a signal to third parties. (2015). .
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  27. The role of ideas in political economy. (2015). Tarko, Vlad.
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  28. The Political Economy of Predation. (2015). Vahabi, Mehrdad.
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  29. Theory of Indiscriminate Violence. (2014). Zhukov, Yuri.
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  30. Optimism and commitment: an elementary theory of bargaining and war. (2012). Sánchez-Pagés, Santiago ; Ponsati, Clara ; Sanchez-Pages, Santiago.
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  31. Clausewitz on Auctions. (2012). Hafner, Samuel.
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  32. The Reasons for Wars: An Updated Survey. (2011). Morelli, Massimo ; Jackson, Matthew O..
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  33. Ethnic polarization and the duration of civil wars. (2010). Reynal-Querol, Marta ; Montalvo, Jose .
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  34. Knowing Your Enemy: Information and Commitment Problems in Civil Wars. (2010). .
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  35. Peace agreements without commitment. (2010). Corchon, Luis ; Bevia, Carmen.
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  36. Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types. (2009). Fey, Mark ; Ramsay, Kristopher .
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  37. The Equifinality of War Termination. (2009). .
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  38. Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information. (2009). Sánchez-Pagés, Santiago ; Sanchez-Pages, Santiago .
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  39. Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information. (2009). Sánchez-Pagés, Santiago ; Sanchez-Pages, Santiago .
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  40. Principles of Conflict Economics. (2009). Anderton, Charles H ; Carter, John R.
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  41. Settling It on the Field. (2008). .
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  42. Lost in Translation or Full Steam Ahead. (2008). .
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  43. Peace agreements without commitment. (2008). Corchon, Luis ; Bevia, Carmen.
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  44. Peace Agreements Without Commitment. (2008). Corchon, Luis ; Bevia, Carmen.
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  45. Ethnic polarization and the duration of civil wars. (2007). Montalvo, Jose G. ; Reynal-Querol, Marta.
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  46. The Dynamics of Bargaining and War. (2007). Filson, Darren ; Werner, Suzanne .
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  47. Divergent Beliefs in “Bargaining and the Nature of Warâ€. (2006). Stam, Allan.
    In: Journal of Conflict Resolution.
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  48. The Common Priors Assumption. (2006). .
    In: Journal of Conflict Resolution.
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  49. A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments. (2005). Sonin, Konstantin ; Schwarz, Michael.
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  50. How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace. (2004). Slantchev, Branislav.
    In: American Journal of Political Science.
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    In: Game Theory and Information.
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