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The Impact of Interwar Protection: Evidence from India. (2020). Arthi, Vellore ; Oarourke, Kevin Hjortshj ; Nair, Ashwin ; Lampe, Markus.
In: Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers.
RePEc:oxf:esohwp:_180.

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  1. From a common empire to colonial rule: Commodity market disintegration in the Near East. (2024). Panza, Laura.
    In: Economic History Review.
    RePEc:bla:ehsrev:v:77:y:2024:i:2:p:584-611.

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  2. Pandemics and protectionism: evidence from the “Spanish” flu. (2021). Sharp, Paul ; Boberg-Fazlic, Nina ; Pedersen, Maja Uhre ; Lampe, Markus.
    In: Palgrave Communications.
    RePEc:pal:palcom:v:8:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1057_s41599-021-00833-7.

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  3. Four Great Asian Trade Collapses. (2021). Lampe, Markus ; Oarourke, Kevin Hjortshj ; Fernihough, Alan ; de Bromhead, Alan.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:nad:wpaper:20210063.

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  4. The Smoot-Hawley Trade War. (2021). Oarourke, Kevin Hjortshj ; Author, Kirsten Wandschneider ; Mitchener, Kris James.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:nad:wpaper:20210061.

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  5. The Smoot-Hawley Trade War. (2021). O'Rourke, Kevin ; Wandschneider, Kirsten ; Mitchener, KrisJames.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15952.

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  6. The Smoot-Hawley Trade War. (2021). O'Rourke, Kevin ; Oarourke, Kevin Hjortshj ; Wandschneider, Kirsten ; Mitchener, Kris James.
    In: CAGE Online Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cge:wacage:550.

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  7. The Smoot-Hawley Trade War. (2021). O'Rourke, Kevin ; Wandschneider, Kirsten ; Mitchener, Kris James.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8966.

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  8. Four great Asian trade collapses. (2021). O'Rourke, Kevin ; Lampe, Markus ; de Bromhead, Alan ; Fernihough, Alan.
    In: Australian Economic History Review.
    RePEc:bla:ozechr:v:61:y:2021:i:2:p:159-185.

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  9. The Gravitational Constant?. (2020). Jacks, David ; Taylor, Alan M ; Oarourke, Kevin Hjortshj.
    In: Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers.
    RePEc:oxf:esohwp:_184.

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  10. Trade disruption, industrialisation, and the setting sun of British colonial rule in India. (2020). Brey, Björn ; Bonfatti, Roberto.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:not:notgep:2020-13.

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  11. The Gravitational Constant?. (2020). Jacks, David ; Taylor, Alan M ; O'Rourke, Kevin Hjortshj .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:nad:wpaper:20200055.

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  12. Pandemics and protectionism: evidence from the Spanish flu. (2020). Sharp, Paul ; Lampe, Markus ; Pedersen, Maja Uhre ; Boberg-Fazlic, Nina.
    In: IFCS - Working Papers in Economic History.WH.
    RePEc:cte:whrepe:36118.

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  13. Pandemics and Protectionism: Evidence from the “Spanish” flu. (2020). Sharp, Paul ; Pedersen, Maja Uhre ; Lampe, Markus ; Boberg-Fazlic, Nina.
    In: CAGE Online Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cge:wacage:479.

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  1. 40Act XIV of 1899 allowed the government to impose countervailing duties in cases where other governments were subsidising exports to India. Act VIII of 1902 allowed the government to impose duties on imported sugar from countries protecting domestic sugar production by more than a specified amount. 41Act XI of the same year gave the Governor General sweeping powers to restrict international trade.
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  2. 43The rate on sugar was increased to 25%, and that on the afore-mentioned luxury goods to 30%, while tariffs on a range of iron and steel products were raised from 2 to 10%. a year, and involved among other things a boycott of imported cloth; noncooperation lasted until February 1922, when Gandhi cancelled the campaign as a result of an attack on a police station (although he continued to argue for a foreign cloth boycott in the years that followed) (Brown, 1985, pp. 213-8).
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  3. 51Imposing differential duties on Japanese cotton goods would have been in breach of the Indo-Japanese trade agreement of 1904 (U.K. Parliamentary Papers, 1905), which entitled Japan to “the lowest customs duties applicable to similar products of any other foreign origin” (Art. I).
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  4. 52Act XXIII of 1927.
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  5. 57There was a final twist to the take of Indo-Japanese trade relations during this period (Friedman, 1940; Thackeray, 2017, p. 394). Traditionally, the Japanese role in Asian emancipation from Western rule had been a source of inspiration for Indian nationalists, but this image was damaged by Japan’s imperialistic expansion in East Asia. Thus, Indian nationalists criticized the Japanese puppet state in Manchuria, and the Indian National Congress severely condemned the Japanese invasion of China in 1937. At the Haripura Congress of February 1938, Congress called for a boycott of Japanese goods by the Indian population. In August 1939, Nehru himself visited Chiang Kai-shek’s headquarters in Chungking to demonstrate the solidarity of Indian nationalists with the Chinese Government.
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  6. 58Another policy shift discouraging imports, especially from the UK, concerned the procedures for purchasing government stores. In 1924 control of these purchases was transferred from London to the Government of India, and by the 1930s “the bulk of stores were obtained by rupee tender in India rather than by sterling tender in London” (Tomlinson, 1979, p. 63). In this paper we are focussing on private imports, which were unaffected by this policy shift.
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  7. Anderson, James E. and Yoto V. Yotov. 2016. “Terms of Trade and Global Efficiency Effects of Free Trade Agreements, 1990–2002.” Journal of International Economics 99:279–298.

  8. Attention thus turned to the possibility of raising the tariff on cotton textiles from 11% to the general rate of 15%. In 1930, the Indian government faced pressure from two sides: Indian mill owners feared that 15% would not be sufficient to protect them from Japanese competition, while the British government (fiscal autonomy convention notwithstanding) worried about the impact of a 15% tariff on Lancashire. An obvious solution to this political conundrum was to extend the principle of differential protection to the cotton textile industry, imposing higher tariffs on foreign (and in particular Japanese) cloth than on British cloth.
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  9. Baier, Scott L., Amanda Kerr and Yoto V. Yotov. 2018. Gravity, Distance, and International Trade. In Handbook of International Trade and Transportation, ed. Bruce A. Blonigen and Wesley W. Wilson. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing pp. 15–78.

  10. Best, Antony. 2002. “Economic Appeasement or Economic Nationalism? A Political Perspective on the British Empire, Japan, and the Rise of Intra– Asian Trade, 1933-37.” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 30(2):77–101.
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  11. Broadberry, Stephen and Alexander Klein. 2012. “Aggregate and Per Capita GDP in Europe, 1870–2000: Continental, Regional and National Data with Changing Boundaries.” Scandinavian Economic History Review 60(1):79–107.
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  12. Brown, Judith M. 1977. Gandhi and Civil Disobedience : The Mahatma in Indian Politics, 1928-34. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  13. Brown, Judith M. 1985. Modern India : The Origins of an Asian Democracy. Delhi ; Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  14. Casler, Don and Nikhar Gaikwad. 2019. “‘The Interests of India Demand Protection ’: Democratization and Trade Policy Under Empire.” Mimeo, Columbia University .
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  15. Chatterji, B. 1981. “Lancashire and the Making of the Indo-British Trade Agreement, 1939.” Modern Asian Studies 15(3):527–573.
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  16. Chatterji, Basudev. 1983. “The Political Economy of ’Discriminating Protection’ : The Case of Textiles in the 1920s.” The Indian Economic and Social History Review 20(3):239–275.
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  17. Chatterji, Basudev. 1992. Trade, Tariffs, and Empire : Lancashire and British Policy in India 1919-1939. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
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  18. Chaudhuri, K. N. 1983. Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments (1757–1947).
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  19. Correia, Sergio, Paulo Guimarães and Thomas Zylkin. 2019a. “Verifying the Existence of Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Generalized Linear Models.” arXiv:1903.01633 .

  20. Correia, Sergio, Paulo Guimarães and Thomas Zylkin. 2019b. “ppmlhdfe: Fast Poisson Estimation with High-Dimensional Fixed Effects.” arXiv:1903.01690 .

  21. Department of Finance (Japan). 1935. Annual Return of the Foreign Trade of Japan. Part I. Tokyo: Department of Finance.
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  22. Dewey, Clive. 1978. The End of the Imperialism of Free Trade: The Eclipse of the Lancashire Lobby and the Concession of Fiscal Autonomy to India. London: Athlone Press for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies pp. 35–67.
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  23. Drummond, Ian M. 1972. British Economic Policy and the Empire, 1919–1939. London, New York: George Allen and Unwin.
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  24. Dupree, Marguerite. 1987. Lancashire and Whitehall: The Diary of Sir Raymond Streat. Vol. 1 Manchester: Manchester University Press.
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  25. Dye, Alan and Richard Sicotte. 2006. “How brinkmanship saved Chadbourne: Credibility and the International Sugar Agreement of 1931.” Explorations in Economic History 43(2):223–256.

  26. Eichengreen, Barry and Douglas A. Irwin. 1995. “Trade Blocs, Currency Blocs and the Reorientation of World Trade in the 1930s.” Journal of International Economics 38(1–2):1–24.

  27. Estevadeordal, Antoni, Brian Frantz and Alan M. Taylor. 2003. “The Rise and Fall of World Trade, 1870-1939.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(2):359–407.

  28. Fents of all descriptions 1930 1931Sources: Brown (1977), pp. 127-129, 186, 283; Chatterji (1992, 164-5); Wolcott (1991).
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  29. For example, one of our 114 goods is “Refined Sugar”, which is a fairly broad category. Imports of different types of refined sugar were reported over the course of the fourteen years in our sample. For example, “Sugar below 23 Dutch Standard but not below 16 Dutch Standard” and “Sugar, 23 Dutch Standard and above” were reported as separate categories during 1930/31- 1937/38 and we would have preferred to work with these as separate categories in our analysis.
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  30. Friedman, Irving S. 1940. “Indian Nationalism and the Far East.” Pacific Affairs 13(1):17–29.
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  31. Goldberg, P. K. and N. Pavcnik. 2016. The Effects of Trade Policy. In Handbook of Commercial Policy, ed. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger. Vol. 1 Amsterdam: North-Holland pp. 161–206.

  32. goods, although in the following year the Legislative Assembly asked the Indian government to denounce the Ottawa Agreement. There followed a long series of trade negotiations between the British and Indian governments which eventually resulted in a 1939 trade agreement that reduced the range of British imports accorded preferential treatment in India.58 Chaudhuri’s (1983, p. 869) overall assessment is that “India, even before the Second World War, was coming closer towards the adoption of a much more positive policy of controlling her international economy, which was to become characteristic of official thinking after Independence”.
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  33. Gordon, Margaret S. 1941. Barriers to World Trade: A Study of Recent Commercial Policy. New York: Macmillan Company.
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  34. Gupta, Bishnupriya. 2001. “The International Tea Cartel during the Great Depression, 1929–1933.” The Journal of Economic History 61(1):144–159.

  35. Hillberry, Russell and David Hummels. 2013. Trade Elasticity Parameters for a Computable General Equilibrium Model. In Handbook of Computable General Equilibrium Modeling, ed. B. Dixon Peter and W. Jorgenson Dale. Vol. 1 Amsterdam: Elsevier pp. 1213–1269.

  36. Hlaing, Aye. 1964. “Trends of Economic Growth and Income Distribution in Burma, 1870-1940.” Journal of the Burma Research Society XLVII(i):89–148.
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  37. However, in 1896 the import tariff on cotton piece goods was lowered to 3%, while the duty on cotton yarn was abolished (Act III). Since the excise duties on domestically produced cotton goods (both yarn and cloth), at a new rate of 3% (Act II), were not abolished , there was now a negative rate of protection for the Indian cotton spinning industry (Kumar, 1983, p. 921). On the eve of the war India was thus a virtually free-trading country, and such tariffs as were levied were designed to raise revenue rather than to protect domestic industries.40 World War 1 was an important turning point. First, the war effort required revenue, and the most obvious way for India to raise more was to increase tariffs.
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  38. In addition to trade policy, Indian industries were also involved in a number of cartels which may have influenced trade flows during this period. Indian producers joined an international tea agreement in 1930. This was not renewed in 1931 and 1932, but from 1933 up to the Second World War it attempted to freeze the market share of the three participating countries, India, Ceylon and the Dutch East Indies (Gupta, 2001; Suslow, 2005). The tea agreements seem to have been moderately successful in 1930 in slowing the decline in tea prices, and to have stabilized and reflated tea prices after 1933, a period when prices for similar goods such as cocoa and coffee continued to fall (Gupta, 2001; Rowe, 1965, pp. 90, 148-51). Since the agreement mostly affected Indian producers and exporters of tea, its effect on tea imports remains unclear in the literature.
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  39. In March 1933 the 50% tariffs were extended through October; in April, India gave Japan six months notice of its intention to denounce the 1904 trade treaty, which would allow it to discriminate against Japanese imports ; later in the same month the Safeguarding of Industries Act empowered the Indian Governor General to impose “a duty of customs of such amount as he considers necessary to safeguard the interests of the industry affected”, in cases where goods were being imported “at such abnormally low prices that the existence of an industry established in British India is thereby endangered” (Act XIII). In May the UK further increased the pressure on Japan by giving twelve months notice of its intention to denounce those portions of the Anglo-Japanese trade treaty dealing with West Africa and the West Indies (Best, 2002, p. 83). On the 7th of June the tariff on non-British cotton goods was increased to 75%.
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  40. In September 1931, Britain left the gold standard. The October election brought to power a National Government and strengthened the hand of those in Britain advocating for protection and Imperial Preference. The first moves towards protection were made in November 1931, and in the same month the British government started preparing for the forthcoming Imperial Economic Conference, to be held in Ottawa the following summer. Their hope was that bilateral tariff bargains could be struck between the participants there (the UK, 53Indian Finance (Supplementary and Extending) Act, 1931. 54The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 45, p. 433. Available at https://web.archive.org/web/20151024131012/https://www.gandhiheritageportal.org/.
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  41. In The Cambridge Economic History of India: Volume 2: c.1751–c.1970, ed. Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp. 804–877.
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  42. India, and the Dominions) which would then be generalised as far as possible, in “most-favoured-Imperial-nation” fashion (Drummond, 1972, pp. 90-91). In February 1932 the UK Import Duties Act imposed a general 10% tariff on imports not already subject to duties, with exceptions being made for a variety of raw materials and foodstuffs, including raw cotton and wheat (Gordon, 1941, p. 219). Imports from India were exempted from the tariffs until November, giving time for an Anglo-Indian trade agreement to be signed at Ottawa.
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  43. Indian import tariffs had traditionally been low, reflecting the country’s colonial status and the liberal inclinations of the British imperial power.39 Land, opium, and salt provided the bulk of the Indian government’s revenues: customs duties only accounted for 10% of government revenue in 1860-61, and just 5% ten years later (Kumar, 1983, p. 916). Tariffs had been increased in the wake of the 1857 Mutiny, but under pressure from Lancashire cotton interests they were gradually reduced, and they were abolished altogether (except for on salt and alcohol) in 1882. Acts VIII and XVI of 1894 introduced a general tariff of 5%, with the duty on cotton yarns being offset by an equivalent domestic excise duty so as to ensure that Indian manufacturers were not unfairly favoured (Act XVI).
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  44. Indian Tariff Board. 1932. Report of the Indian Tariff Board Regarding the Grant of Protection to the Cotton Textile Industry. Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication Branch.
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  45. Interest rates on Indian government debt rose. The general tariff was further increased to 11% in 1921 (Act VI): cotton textiles were included and once again there was no offsetting increase in domestic excise duties (Dewey, 1978, pp. 43-4).42 The following year the general tariff was once again raised, to 15%, with imported cotton yarn now being subject to a duty of 5% (Act XII) (duties on cotton piece goods remained unchanged) (Mukherjee, 2001, p. 732).43 De facto, Indian cotton textiles were now enjoying substantial protection, despite the fact that tariffs were being imposed for revenue reasons (Drummond, 1972, p. 123), and were by this stage a more important source of government revenue than the land tax.
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  46. International producer cartels in which British India was a member were coded from Suslow (2005, Appendix 1). This was supplemented by information on primary goods, and especially international sugar cartels, in Dye and Sicotte (2006), US Secretary of Agriculture (1933), and Rowe (1965), and by information on the Achnacarry and subsequent agreements in the petroleum industry, in United States Congress, Senate (1952). We only include formal cartel agreements concluded by British India domestic producers, trade organizations, or the government. Cartels have to be in force at least 6 month in the corresponding year to be coded as dummy=1. Only cartel members included in our country sample are mentioned in the table.
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  47. Irwin, Douglas A. 1998. “The Smoot-Hawley Tariff: A Quantitative Assessment. ” Review of Economics and Statistics 80(2):326–334.

  48. Irwin, Douglas A. 2012. Trade Policy Disaster : Lessons from the 1930s. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
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  49. Kitson, Michael and Solomos Solomou. 1990. Protectionism and Economic Revival : The British Interwar Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. GB-9000742 Michael Kitson and Solomos Solomou ill. ; 25 cm.

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  51. Kumar, Dharma. 1983. The Fiscal System. In The Cambridge Economic History of India: Volume 2: c.1751–c.1970, ed. Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp. 905–944.
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  52. Madsen, Jakob B. 2001. “Trade Barriers and the Collapse of World Trade during the Great Depression.” Southern Economic Journal 67(4):848–868.

  53. Mukherjee, Aditya. 2001. “British Industrial Policy and the Question of Fiscal Autonomy, 1916–1930.” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 62:726– 755.
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  54. Osamu, Ishii. 2000. Markets and Diplomacy: The Anglo-Japanese Rivalries over Cotton Goods Markets, 1930–36. In The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000: Volume II: The Political–Diplomatic Dimension, 1931–2000, ed. Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK pp. 51–77.
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  55. Ottaviano, Gianmarco I. P. and Giovanni Peri. 2012. “Rethinking the Effect of Immigration on Wages.” Journal of the European Economic Association 10(1):152–197.

  56. Per cent 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 Year Benchmark Fiscal year tariffs Gamma=0.5 Gamma=2 OLS OLS, fiscal year tariffs Impact of post-1923 policy shifts on total Indian imports 0 10 20 30 40 Per cent 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 Year Benchmark Fiscal year tariffs Gamma=0.5 Gamma=2 OLS OLS, fiscal year tariffs Impact of post-1923 policy shifts on total UK exports to India -40 -30 -20 -10 0
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  57. Per cent 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 Year Benchmark Fiscal year tariffs Gamma=0.5 Gamma=2 OLS OLS, fiscal year tariffs Impact of post-1923 policy shifts on total Japanese cotton cloth exports to India Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers are edited by Jakob Schneebacher (Nuffield College, Oxford, OX1 1NF) Marco Molteni (Pembroke College, Oxford, OX1 1DW) Papers may be downloaded from: https://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/50?search=working_papers&task=search
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  58. Per cent 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 Year Benchmark Fiscal year tariffs Gamma=0.5 Gamma=2 OLS OLS, fiscal year tariffs Impact of post-1923 policy shifts on total Japanese exports to India Figure 11: Impact of protection on cotton cloth exports to India with different elasticities 0 20 40 60 80 Per cent 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 Year Benchmark Fiscal year tariffs Gamma=0.5 Gamma=2 OLS OLS, fiscal year tariffs Impact of post-1923 policy shifts on total UK cotton cloth exports to India -60 -40 -20 0
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  59. Ramana, Duvvuri V. 1969. National Accounts and Input-Output Accounts of India. Bombay, New York: Asia Publishing House.
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  60. Rothermund, Dietmar. 1988. An Economic History of India : From PreColonial Times to 1986. London: Croom Helm.
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  65. Since tariffs were at this stage the most important source of revenue in India the case for increasing customs duties became politically unanswerable, even in the face of stiff opposition from Lancashire cotton interests (Chatterji, 1992, pp. 347-8). And by this stage Indian politics required that at least some of these increases be protective in nature.
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  66. Sivasubramonian, S. 2000. The National Income of India in the Twentieth Century. Delhi, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  67. South West Africa), United Kingdom, United States of America, Yugoslavia 1938 61002 Beet Sugar 61003 Unrefined Sugar 61004 Molasses International Petroleum Cartel (Achnacarry) 312001 Crude Petroleum All except Russia (Soviet Union) 1929313001 Fuel Oils 313002 Kerosene 313003 Lubricating Oils 313004 Refined Petroleum.
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  68. Statistical Office of the Customs and Excise Department (United Kingdom). 1937. Annual Statement of The Trade of the United Kingdom with British Countries and Foreign Countries. 1935 Compared with the Years 1931-1934. Vol. I. London: HMSO.
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  69. Statistical Office of the United Nations. 1951. “Standard International Trade Classification.” Statistical Papers Series M(10, second edition).
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  70. Statistical Office of the United Nations. 1953. “Commodity Indexes for the Standard International Trade Classification, Preliminary Issue.” Statistical Papers Series M(10, indexed version).
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  71. Stubbings, Matthew. 2019. “Free Trade Empire to Commonwealth of Nations: India, Britain and Imperial Preference, 1903–1932.” The International History Review 41(2):323–344.
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  72. Suslow, Valerie Y. 2005. “Cartel Contract Duration: Empirical Evidence from Inter-War International Cartels.” Industrial and Corporate Change 14(5):705– 744.

  73. Table 3 lists the top 10 goods by import value in 1923/24, 1930/31 and 1937/38. As can be seen the lists are dominated by cotton manufactures and machinery.
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  74. Table 7: Non-tariff barriers to trade Commodity Description of commodity Years 652002 Textiles. Cotton. Manufactures. Piecegoods. Grey unbleached 1934652003 Textiles. Cotton. Manufactures. Piecegoods. Total of White (bleached) 1934652004 Textiles. Cotton. Manufactures. Piecegoods. Printed 1934652005 Textiles. Cotton. Manufactures. Piecegoods. Dyed Goods 1934652006 Textiles. Cotton. Manufactures. Piecegoods. Woven coloured 1934652007 Textiles. Cotton. Manufactures. Piecegoods. Fents of all descriptions | 1937Source: U.K. Parliamentary Papers (1933-34, pp. 471-478, especially Protocol, Article 7, p.
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  75. Table 8 codes the boycotts of UK cotton cloth in the short run (1930) and long run (1931 and subsequently). In all cases the “cotton cloth boycott” dummy variables in the regressions reported in Table 1 take the value 1 for the goods and years mentioned (for the U.K. only).
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  76. Table 8: Boycotts Goods Name Years (1930) Year (“Long run”) 652001 Cotton. Manufactures. Canvas 1930 1931652002 Textiles. Cotton. Manufactures. Piecegoods.
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  77. Table 9: Cartels Cartel Goods Name Countries Years Rubber (crude) 231001 Rubber, raw British Malaya (all federated and non federated); Dutch East India 1934Tea (1) 74001 Tea Dutch East India 1930 Tea (2) 74001 Tea Dutch East India 1933International Agreement Regarding the Regulation of Production and Marketing of Sugar (Chadbourne) 61001 Refined Sugar Austria, Belgium, Brazil, China (excl. Hong Kong, Macao, Kwantung), Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dutch East India, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland (incl. Dantzig), Russia, Union of South Africa (incl.
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  78. Thackeray, David. 2017. “Buying for Britain, China, or India? Patriotic Trade, Ethnicity, and Market in the 1930s British Empire/Commonwealth.” Journal of Global History 12(3):386–409.

  79. The end of the world war did not bring peace to India: war with Afghanistan in 1919 was followed by the Waziri uprising which lasted into the following year.
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  80. The general tariff was therefore increased from 5 to 7% in 1916, although cotton duties remained unchanged which greatly limited the fiscal benefit of the measure (Act IV).41 By late 1916 Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for India, was demanding a 100 million contribution by India to the war effort, while Indian nationalists objected to the exclusion of cotton from the general tariff increase. The Government of India eventually acceeded to Chamberlain’s request, but only after the British government had agreed to allow India to raise duties on cotton goods (still not including yarn) to 7% (Act VI of 1917), 39While we make extensive references to the secondary literature below, an invaluable source remains the Indian legislation of the period.
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  81. The International Rubber Regulation Agreement of 1934 only came into force as international recovery after the Great Depression was already underway, and India was a fairly minor player in this market in comparison to Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, Ceylon and Indochina (Rowe, 1965, pp. 90, 152-4), so the consequences of the export quotas agreed upon by the contracting parties on the structure of Indian imports remains unclear as well. India was also probably affected by the Achnacarry and subsequent agreements in the petroleum industry (United States Congress, Senate, 1952), as well as by the Chadbourne sugar agreement, which India joined together with the UK in late 1937 (Dye and Sicotte, 2006). Table 9 below provides data on how these cartels were coded in our dataset.
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  82. The newly constituted Tariff Board immediately set about considering the case for protection of the iron and steel industry. The Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO) had been founded in 1907, and proved a useful asset during the war. By 1921 it was in trouble, however, due to imported steel from the European continent, in particular Belgium: it was this which had led the Indian governemnt to set up the Fiscal Commission in the first place (Wagle, 1981).
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  83. This however ran into the problem that the Indian Legislature was opposed to Imperial Preference. The eventual solution, adopted in April 1930, was to increase duties on British piece goods to 15% , with duties on foreign piece goods 50Act XIX of 1926.
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  84. This recommendation, accepted by the British government in 1921, that Britain acknowledge India’s right to “fiscal autonomy” took the form of a “convention ” rather than a statute, since the latter would have limited “the ultimate power of Parliament to control the administration of India” and “the power of veto which rests in the Crown”. Indian historians have pointed out that the Government of India was supposed to consult the British government before tabling fiscal policy proposals, and have argued that the British government de facto retained significant control over Indian trade policy (Mukherjee, 2001, pp. 734-5). Yet the succeeding two decades saw the gradual development of far more interventionist trade policies in the sub-continent.
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  85. Tokarick, Stephen. 2014. “A Method for Calculating Export Supply and Import Demand Elasticities.” The Journal of International Trade and Economic Development 23(7):1059–1087.

  86. Tomlinson, B. R. 1979. The Political Economy of the Raj, 1914-1947 : The Economics of Decolonization in India. London: Macmillan.
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  87. Total of White (bleached) 1930 1931652004 Textiles. Cotton. Manufactures. Piecegoods.
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  88. U.K. Parliamentary Papers. 1905. “Treaty Series. No. 13. 1905. Convention Between the United Kingdom and Japan Respecting Commercial Relations between Japan and India.” Command Papers 103(Cd. 2489).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  89. U.K. Parliamentary Papers. 1919. “Joint Select Committee on the Government of India Bill, Vol. I. Report and Proceedings of the Committee.” House of Commons Papers 4(203).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  90. U.K. Parliamentary Papers. 1922 Sess II. “Report of the Indian Fiscal Commission 1921-22.” Command Papers 2(Cmd. 1764).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  91. U.K. Parliamentary Papers. 1930-31. “Imperial Conference, 1930. Summary of Proceedings.” Command Papers 14(Cmd. 3717).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  92. U.K. Parliamentary Papers. 1931-32a. “Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa 1932. Appendices to the Summary of Proceedings.” Command Papers 10(Cmd. 4175).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  93. U.K. Parliamentary Papers. 1931-32b. “Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa 1932. Summary of Proceedings and Copies of Trade Agreements.” Command Papers 11(Cmd. 4174).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  94. U.K. Parliamentary Papers. 1933-34. “Japan No. 2 (1934). Convention between His Majesty in Respect of India and the Emperor of Japan Regarding Commercial Relations Between India and Japan with Protocol.” Command Papers 27(Cmd. 4460).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  95. U.K. Parliamentary Papers. 1934-35. “Accounts relating to the Trade and Navigation of the United Kingdom in each month during the year 1935. December, 1935.” House of Commons Papers 21.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  96. U.K. Parliamentary Papers. 1937-38. “Treaty Series No. 50 (1937). Protocol Regarding Commercial Relations Between India and Japan [with exchange of notes regarding the prolongation of the convention of July 12, 1934].” Command Papers 31(Cmd. 5600).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  97. United States Congress, Senate. 1952. The International Petroleum Cartel. Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission Submitted to the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  98. US Secretary of Agriculture. 1933. World Trade Barriers in Relation to American Agriculture. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office.

  99. Wagle, Dileep M. 1981. “Imperial Preference and the Indian Steel Industry, 1924–391.” The Economic History Review 34(1):120–131.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  100. What about the boycotts? Brown (1977, p. 129) argues that the 193031 “piece-goods trade boycott clearly had a marked effect since the decline in imports was greater than that of other commodities and affected British goods more than those from other countries”. Chatterji (1992, pp. 164-5) argues that while it is difficult to disentangle the impact of boycotts from all the other factors influencing Indian imports during the period, boycotts were a “factor working against Lancashire during the inter-War years”. He quotes British officials who in 1932 were of the opinion that the boycott had had “very considerable effects” on British cotton sales, which had slumped more than imports in general; a particular worry was that boycotts might have permanent effects, by shifting tastes towards locally produced cloth.
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  101. Wolcott, Susan. 1991. “British Myopia and the Collapse of Indian Textile Demand. ” Journal of Economic History 51(2):367–384.

  102. Wolf, Nikolaus and Albrecht O. Ritschl. 2011. “Endogeneity of Currency Areas and Trade Blocs: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.” Kyklos 64(2):291– 312. Appendix 1. Indian interwar trade policy This section provides an expanded and self-contained account of the description of Indian trade policy contained in Section 2.

  103. Woven coloured 1930 1931652007 Textiles. Cotton. Manufactures. Piecegoods.
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