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Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction. (2001). Lopomo, Giuseppe (Pino).
In: Games and Economic Behavior.
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:36:y:2001:i:2:p:219-240.

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Cited: 8

Citations received by this document

Cites: 18

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

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Coauthors: 0

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Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all?. (2020). Balmaceda, Felipe.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:49:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-019-00700-5.

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  2. Goodwill Can Hurt: A theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions. (2016). Cadsby, Charles ; Wang, Ruqu ; Du, Ninghua ; Zhang, Jun.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:99:y:2016:i:c:p:224-238.

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  3. Goodwill Can Hurt: a Theoretical and Experimental Investigation of Return Policies in Auctions. (2015). Cadsby, Charles ; Zhang, Jun ; Wang, Ruqu ; Du, Ninghua .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gue:guelph:2015-01.

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  4. Common Value Auctions with Return Policies. (2010). Zhang, Jun ; Wang, Ruqu.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:qed:wpaper:1235.

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  5. Auction Design without Commitment. (2009). Vartiainen, Hannu.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp44.

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  6. Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?. (2009). Klemperer, Paul ; Bulow, Jeremy.
    In: Economics Papers.
    RePEc:nuf:econwp:0905.

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  7. Asymmetric English auctions. (2003). Krishna, Vijay.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:112:y:2003:i:2:p:261-288.

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  8. Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions. (2002). Riley, John ; Haile, Philip ; Bikhchandani, Sushil.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:38:y:2002:i:1:p:19-27.

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References

References cited by this document

  1. Bikhchandani, S. ; Riley, J. Equilibria in Open Common Value Auctions. 1991 J. Econ. Theory. 53 101-130

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  3. Cassady, R. . 1967 Univ. of California Press: Berkeley
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  4. Crèmer, J. ; McLean, R. Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions. 1988 Econometrica. 56 1247-1257

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  6. Kolgomorov, A.N. ; Fomin, S.V. . 1970 Dover: New York
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  7. Krishna, V. ; Morgan, J. An Analysis of the War of Attrition and All-Pay Auction. 1996 J. Econ. Theory. 72 343-362
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  8. Lopomo, G. The English Auction Is Optimal among Simple Sequential Auctions. 1998 J. Econ. Theory. 82 144-166

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  14. Milgrom, P. The Economics of Competitive Bidding: A Selective Survey. 1985 En : Hurwicz, L. Social Goals and Social Organization. Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner. Cambridge Univ. Press: Cambridge
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  15. Milgrom, P. ; Weber, R. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding. 1982 Econometrica. 50 1089-1122

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Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Collusion and signaling in auctions with interdependent values. (2017). Troyan, Peter .
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:170:y:2017:i:c:p:319-345.

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  2. Goodwill Can Hurt: A theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions. (2016). Cadsby, Charles ; Wang, Ruqu ; Du, Ninghua ; Zhang, Jun.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:99:y:2016:i:c:p:224-238.

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  3. Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective. (2016). Lorentziadis, Panos L.
    In: European Journal of Operational Research.
    RePEc:eee:ejores:v:248:y:2016:i:2:p:347-371.

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  4. Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction. (2014). Long, Yan.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:3:p:356-360.

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  5. Information concentration in common value environments. (2013). Shor, Mikhael ; Mares, Vlad .
    In: Review of Economic Design.
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  6. Distributional Perfect Equilibrium in Bayesian Games with Applications to Auctions. (2013). Bajoori, Elnaz .
    In: Department of Economics Working Papers.
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  7. An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values. (2011). Wooders, John ; Shahriar, Quazi.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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  8. The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral k-double auctions. (2011). Gresik, Thomas.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
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  9. The insiders curse. (2011). Hernando-Veciana, Angel ; Troge, Michael.
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  10. The value of information for auctioneers. (2009). Hagedorn, Marcus.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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  11. The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle. (2009). Lamy, Laurent.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:1:p:390-413.

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  12. Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions. (2009). Larson, Nathan.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:2:p:430-460.

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  13. Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids. (2009). Hernando-Veciana, Angel.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:2:p:372-405.

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  14. Technology market intermediaries to facilitate external technology exploitation: The case of IP auctions. (2008). Tietze, Frank.
    In: Working Papers.
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  15. First-Price, Second-Price, and English Auctions with Resale. (2008). Lebrun, Bernard.
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  16. The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions. (2008). Athias, Laure ; Nunez, Antonio .
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  17. On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions. (2008). Mezzetti, Claudio ; Tsetlin, Ilia.
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
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  18. Irrationality in English auctions. (2008). Gonçalves, Ricardo ; Gonalves, Ricardo.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
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  19. The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions. (2008). Kosmopoulou, Georgia ; Dunne, Timothy ; De Silva, Dakshina ; Kankanamge, Anuruddha.
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  20. A communication equilibrium in English auctions with discrete bidding. (2008). Gonçalves, Ricardo ; Gonalves, Ricardo.
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  21. Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation. (2007). McAdams, David.
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  22. The effect of shill bidding upon prices: Experimental evidence. (2007). Kosmopoulou, Georgia ; De Silva, Dakshina.
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  23. Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions. (2007). Ye, Lixin.
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  24. The Effect of Shill Bidding upon Prices: Experimental Evidence. (2005). Kosmopoulou, Georgia ; De Silva, Dakshina.
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  25. Rational Participation Revolutionizes Auction Theory. (2005). Harstad, Ronald.
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  26. Rational Participation Revolutionizes Auction Theory. (2005). Harstad, Ronald.
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  27. All equilibria of the Vickrey auction. (2004). Heidhues, Paul ; Blume, Andreas.
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  28. Successful uninformed bidding. (2004). Hernando-Veciana, Angel.
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  29. Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction. (2004). Lopomo, Giuseppe (Pino).
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  30. Joint Bidding in Common Value Auctions: Theory and Evidence. (2003). Shor, Mikhael ; Mares, Vlad .
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  31. Exchanging Price Information can be Efficient: per se offences should be legilsated very sparingly. (2003). Evans, Lew ; Mellsop, James .
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  33. Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions. (2003). Riley, John ; Maskin, Eric.
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  34. Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions. (2002). Riley, John ; Haile, Philip ; Bikhchandani, Sushil.
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  35. Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study. (2002). Offerman, Theo ; Goeree, Jacob.
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  36. Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction. (2001). Lopomo, Giuseppe (Pino).
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:36:y:2001:i:2:p:219-240.

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  37. Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study. (2000). Offerman, Theo ; Goeree, Jacob ; JacobK. Goeree, .
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  38. Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study. (2000). Goeree, Jacob ; JacobK. Goeree, ; Offerman, Theo.
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  39. Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values. (2000). Goeree, Jacob ; JacobK. Goeree, ; Offerman, Theo.
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  40. An Alternating Recognition Model of English Auctions. (2000). Harstad, Ronald ; Rothkopf, Michael H..
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  41. Information acquisition and research differentiation prior to an open-bid auction1. (2000). Moresi, Serge.
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  42. Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price. (2000). Persico, Nicola ; Lizzeri, Alessandro.
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  43. Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions. (2000). Riley, John ; Haile, Philip ; Bikhchandani, Sushil.
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  44. Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values. (1999). Offerman, Theo ; Goeree, Jacob.
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  45. THE ECONOMETRICS OF ENGLISH AUCTIONS. (1998). Shum, Matthew.
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  46. Prices and the Winners Curse. (1998). Bulow, Jeremy ; Klemperer, Paul.
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  47. Coordination in Auctions with Entry. (1998). Campbell, Colin.
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  48. The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions. (1998). Lopomo, Giuseppe (Pino).
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:82:y:1998:i:1:p:144-166.

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  49. Common value auctions with independent types. (1996). Branco, Fernando .
    In: Review of Economic Design.
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  50. Cross-game learning: Experimental evidence from first-price and English common value auctions. (1995). Kagel, John.
    In: Economics Letters.
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