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Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: Theory and Experimental Results.. (2012). Sheremeta, Roman ; Masters, William ; Cason, Timothy.
In: Working Papers.
RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-04.

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Cited: 45

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Cites: 46

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  1. Invoking social comparison to improve performance by ranking employees: The moderating effects of public ranking, rank pay, and individual risk attitude. (2019). Cadsby, Charles ; Engle-Warnick, Jim ; Song, Fei ; Fang, Tony.
    In: Journal of Economic Psychology.
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  2. Competing for market shares: Does the order of moves matter even when it shouldn’t?. (2019). Stracke, Rudi ; Kerschbamer, Rudolf ; Hortnagl, Tanja .
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:166:y:2019:i:c:p:346-365.

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  3. New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Multi-Battle Contests. (2018). Sheremeta, Roman ; Mago, Shakun.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:85337.

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  4. The Role of Noise in Alliance Formation and Collusion in Conflicts. (2017). Shunda, Nicholas ; Sanders, Shane ; Boudreau, James W.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:81533.

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  5. Distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests. (2017). Hoffmann, Magnus ; Kolmar, Martin.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:142:y:2017:i:c:p:120-139.

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  6. New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Multi-Battle Contests. (2017). Sheremeta, Roman ; Mago, Shakun.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:chu:wpaper:17-25.

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  7. Balance of power and the propensity of conflict. (2015). Morath, Florian ; Konrad, Kai ; Herbst, Luisa .
    In: Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc15:112837.

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  8. New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests. (2015). Sheremeta, Roman ; Irfanoglu, Zeynep ; Mago, Shakun.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:67520.

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  9. Endowment Origin, Demographic Effects and Individual Preferences in Contests. (2015). Simon, Curtis ; Sheremeta, Roman.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:67519.

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  10. Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research. (2015). Sheremeta, Roman.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:67515.

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  11. Tacit Collusion in Repeated Contests with Noise. (2015). Shunda, Nicholas ; Boudreau, James.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:65671.

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  12. Strategically equivalent contests. (2015). Sheremeta, Roman ; Chowdhury, Subhasish.
    In: Theory and Decision.
    RePEc:kap:theord:v:78:y:2015:i:4:p:587-601.

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  13. A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments. (2015). Sheremeta, Roman ; Kovenock, Dan ; Dechenaux, Emmanuel.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:18:y:2015:i:4:p:609-669.

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  14. Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research. (2015). Sheremeta, Roman.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:chu:wpaper:15-21.

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  15. A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments. (2014). Sheremeta, Roman ; Kovenock, Dan ; Dechenaux, Emmanuel.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:59714.

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  16. Behavioral Dimensions of Contests. (2014). Sheremeta, Roman.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:57751.

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  17. Behavior in Contests. (2014). Sheremeta, Roman.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:57451.

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  18. Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules. (2014). Turocy, Theodore ; Sheremeta, Roman ; Chowdhury, Subhasish.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:55922.

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  19. Strategically Equivalent Contests. (2014). Sheremeta, Roman ; Chowdhury, Subhasish.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:55450.

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  20. Balance of power and the propensity of conflict. (2014). Morath, Florian ; Konrad, Kai ; Herbst, Luisa .
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2014-13_2.

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  21. An experimental study of bidding in contests of incomplete information. (2014). Ryvkin, Dmitry ; Brookins, Philip.
    In: Experimental Economics.
    RePEc:kap:expeco:v:17:y:2014:i:2:p:245-261.

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  22. Uncertain contest success function. (2014). Grossmann, Martin.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:33:y:2014:i:c:p:134-148.

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  23. When parity promotes peace: Resolving conflict between asymmetric agents. (2014). Shields, Timothy ; Sheremeta, Roman ; Kimbrough, Erik.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:99:y:2014:i:c:p:96-108.

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  24. Economic incentives and social preferences: Causal evidence of non-separability. (2014). Stanca, Luca ; Faravelli, Marco.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:108:y:2014:i:c:p:273-289.

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  25. Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules. (2014). Turocy, Theodore ; Sheremeta, Roman ; Chowdhury, Subhasish.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:224-238.

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  26. On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict. (2014). van Winden, Frans ; Reuben, Ernesto ; Lagos, Francisco ; Lacomba, Juan A..
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:86:y:2014:i:c:p:40-57.

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  27. The New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Election Contests. (2014). Sheremeta, Roman ; Mago, Shakun D. ; Irfanoglu, Zeynep B..
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:chu:wpaper:14-15.

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  28. Behavioral Dimensions of Contests. (2014). Sheremeta, Roman.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:chu:wpaper:14-14.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  29. Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules. (2014). Turocy, Theodore ; Sheremeta, Roman ; Chowdhury, Subhasish.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:chu:wpaper:14-08.

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  30. Strategically Equivalent Contests. (2014). Sheremeta, Roman ; Chowdhury, Subhasish.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:chu:wpaper:14-06.

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  31. Group Conflicts. Where do we stand?. (2013). Kolmar, Martin.
    In: Economics Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:usg:econwp:2013:31.

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  32. When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents. (2013). Shields, Timothy ; Sheremeta, Roman ; Kimbrough, Erik.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:52922.

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  33. Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence. (2013). Sheremeta, Roman ; Shupp, Robert.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:49889.

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  34. Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments. (2013). Sheremeta, Roman.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:44124.

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  35. Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games. (2013). Sefton, Martin ; Renner, Elke ; Fallucchi, Francesco.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:not:notcdx:2013-02.

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  36. Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Causal Evidence of Non-Separability. (2013). Stanca, Luca ; Faravelli, Marco.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:mib:wpaper:250.

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  37. On the Escalation and De-Escalation of Conflict. (2013). van Winden, Frans ; Reuben, Ernesto ; Lagos, Francisco ; Lacomba, Juan A..
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7492.

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  38. Resource allocation contests: Experimental evidence. (2013). Sheremeta, Roman ; Shupp, Robert ; Schmidt, David ; Walker, James.
    In: Journal of Economic Psychology.
    RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:39:y:2013:i:c:p:257-267.

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  39. Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games. (2013). Sefton, Martin ; Renner, Elke ; Fallucchi, Francesco.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:64:y:2013:i:c:p:223-240.

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  40. Intention-based fairness preferences in two-player contests. (2013). Hoffmann, Magnus ; Kolmar, Martin.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:276-279.

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  41. When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents. (2013). Shields, Timothy ; Sheremeta, Roman ; Kimbrough, Erik.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:chu:wpaper:13-33.

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  42. Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments. (2013). Sheremeta, Roman.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:chu:wpaper:13-06.

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  43. Information Feedback and Contest Structure in Rent-Seeking Games. (2012). Sefton, Martin ; Renner, Elke ; Fallucchi, Francesco.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:not:notcdx:2012-12.

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  44. Extremism Drives Out Moderation. (2012). Kovenock, Dan ; Klose, Bettina.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-10.

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  45. Endowment Origin, Demographic Effects and Individual Preferences in Contests. (2012). Sheremeta, Roman ; Price, Curtis.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-07.

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    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:78:y:2011:i:1:p:167-182.

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  30. A dynamic model of conflict and appropriation. (2011). Mino, Kazuo ; Itaya, Jun-ichi ; Eggert, Wolfgang.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:78:y:2011:i:1-2:p:167-182.

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  31. Defending against multiple different attackers. (2011). Hausken, Kjell ; Bier, Vicki M..
    In: European Journal of Operational Research.
    RePEc:eee:ejores:v:211:y:2011:i:2:p:370-384.

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  32. Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: Axiomatization. (2010). Blavatskyy, Pavlo R..
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:2:p:267-276.

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  33. Generalized contest success functions. (2009). Sarin, Rajiv ; Rai, Birendra.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:40:y:2009:i:1:p:139-149.

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  34. Contests with Random Noise and a Shared Prize. (2009). Sheremeta, Roman ; Masters, William ; Cason, Timothy.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:58271.

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  35. Foreclosure in contests. (2009). Sand, Jan ; Foros, Øystein ; Clark, Derek J..
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2008_027.

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  36. Socially-Tolerable Discrimination. (2008). Amegashie, Atsu J..
    In: MPRA Paper.
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  37. Socially-Tolerable Discrimination. (2008). Amegashie, Atsu J..
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:8238.

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  38. Socially-Tolerable Discrimination. (2008). Amegashie, A..
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gue:guelph:2008-6.

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  39. Socially-Tolerable Discrimination. (2008). Amegashie, Atsu J..
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2292.

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  40. THE Economics of Match-Fixing. (2007). Caruso, Raul.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:3085.

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  41. Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A Note. (2007). Caruso, Raul.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:2316.

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  42. Recirpcity in the shadow of Threat. (2007). Caruso, Raul.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:1788.

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  43. Conflict and Conflict Managment with Asymmetric Stakes (The Bad-Cop and the Good Cop part II). (2007). Caruso, Raul.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:1438.

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  44. Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A note. (2007). .
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2007:i:17:p:1-8.

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  45. Continuing Conflict and Stalemate: A note. (2007). Caruso, Raul.
    In: Economics Bulletin.
    RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07d70005.

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  46. Conflict and Conflict Management with Interdependent Instruments and Asymmetric Stakes,(The Good-Cop and the Bad-Cop Game). (2006). Caruso, Raul.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:214.

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  47. Biased Contests. (2006). Porteiro, Nicolás ; Dahm, Matthias.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:pab:wpaper:06.21.

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  48. Conflict and Conflict Management with Interdependent Instruments and Asymmetric Stakes, (The Good-Cop and the Bad-Cop Game). (2006). Caruso, Raul.
    In: Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy.
    RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:12:y:2006:i:1:n:1.

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  49. Cooperation Breakdowns under Incomplete Property Rights. (2005). .
    In: Public Economics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0506006.

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  50. A Micro- Foundation for Non-Deterministic Contests of the Logit Form. (2005). Porteiro, Nicolás ; Dahm, Matthias.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1410.

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